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Reforming the Supreme Court
Appointment Process, 2004-2014:
A 10-Year Democratic Audit*
Adam M. Dodek**

The way in which Justice Rothstein was appointed marks an historic
change in how we appoint judges in this country. It brought
unprecedented openness and accountability to the process. The
hearings allowed Canadians to get to know Justice Rothstein through
their members of Parliament in a way that was not previously
possible.1
— The Rt. Hon. Stephen Harper, PC
[J]udicial appointments … [are] a critical part of the administration of
justice in Canada … This is a legacy issue, and it will live on long
after those who have the temporary stewardship of this position are
no longer there. If the act of appointing judges is a priority, the
process of appointing them is no less so. Indeed, the integrity and

*
This paper is dedicated to Professor Emeritus Jacob Ziegel of the University of Toronto’s
Faculty of Law. I know of no one who cares more passionately about the importance of the Supreme
Court of Canada appointment process. In appreciation.
**
Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa. Exceptional research assistance was provided
by Emily Alderson, J.D. 2015 (expected). Thanks to Stephen Bindman, Ian Greene, Carissima
Mathen, Peter Russell, Nadia Verrelli and two anonymous reviewers for reading earlier drafts and
providing helpful comments. This paper was presented as part of the Osgoode Constitutional
Cases Conference in April 2014. Appreciation to my co-panellists Hugo Cyr, Rosemary Cairns
Way and Bruce Ryder, and to David Schneiderman and Dahlia Lithwick for helpful questions.
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at forums sponsored by the University of Ottawa’s
Public Law Group on Appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada in October 2011 and on the
Supreme Court of Canada in February 2013. Research for this study was funded by the Social
Science and Humanities Research Council.
1
News Release, “Prime Minister announces appointment of Mr. Justice Marshall Rothstein
to the Supreme Court” (March 1, 2006), online: <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2006/03/01/primeminister-announces-appointment-mr-justice-marshall-rothstein-supreme-court>.
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fairness of the process is not unrelated to the excellence and
2
independence of the judiciary.
— The Hon. Irwin Cotler, PC, OC, QC (Minister of Justice
and Attorney General of Canada, 2003–2006)

I. INTRODUCTION
As Irwin Cotler stated above, judicial appointments matter. They
matter because Supreme Court of Canada judges exercise important
functions not only in the administration of justice but also in Canadian
democracy: the Supreme Court is a critical institution in our society. As
Prime Minister Harper declared, the process by which our high court
judges are appointed also matters. It matters for the Supreme Court but
also for the other branches of government: the executive and the legislative (i.e., Parliament). The recent appointment of Justice Nadon raises
serious questions about that appointment process that deserve attention.
On October 22, 2013, the Governor-in-Council directed a reference
to the Supreme Court of Canada regarding the eligibility of Justice Marc
Nadon to be appointed to that Court3 and introduced legislation in an
omnibus budget bill to clarify that federal court judges were qualified for
2
Irwin Cotler, “The Supreme Court Appointment Process: Chronology, Context and
Reform” (2007) 58 U.N.B.L.J. 131, at 131 [hereinafter “Cotler, ‘The Supreme Court Appointment
Process’”]. To the same effect, see Shimon Shetreet & Sophie Turenne, Judges on Trial: The
Independence and Accountability of the English Judiciary, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2013) 102: “In any system, the methods of appointment have direct bearing on
both the integrity and independence of the judges. Weak appointments lower the status of the
judiciary in the eyes of the public and create a climate in which the necessary independence of the
judiciary is liable to be undermined. Similarly, political appointments that are seen by the public as
not based on merit may arouse concern about the judge’s independence and impartiality on the
bench.”
3
Order in Council P.C. 2013-1105. This reference asked the Supreme Court to answer
two questions: (1) “Can a person who was, at any time, an advocate of at least 10 years standing at the
Barreau du Québec be appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada as a member of the Supreme Court
from Quebec pursuant to sections 5 and 6 of the Supreme Court Act?”; and (2) “Can Parliament
enact legislation that requires that a person be or has previously been a barrister or advocate of at
least 10 years standing at the bar of a province as a condition of appointment as a judge of the
Supreme Court of Canada or enact the annexed declaratory provisions as set out in clauses 471 and
472 of the Bill entitled Economic Action Plan 2013 Act, No.2?” The Supreme Court heard the
reference on an abridged timetable on January 15, 2014 and issued its decision (technically an
“advisory opinion”) on March 21, 2014. See Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 6, [2014]
S.C.J. No. 21, 2014 SCC 21 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Supreme Court Reference”]. See generally Justice
Canada, Press Release, “Government of Canada Takes Steps to Clarify Certain Eligibility Criteria
for Supreme Court Justices”, October 22, 2013, online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/news-nouv/
nr-cp/2013/doc_32973.html>.
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appointment under the Supreme Court Act for the three seats designated
for Quebec.4 Less than a month before, on September 30, 2013, the
Prime Minister had announced Justice Nadon as his “nominee” to replace
Justice Morris Fish as one of the three Quebec judges on the Supreme
Court.5 Two days later, on October 2, 2013, Justice Nadon appeared
before a committee of Members of Parliament (“MPs”) for what has
become known colloquially as “a parliamentary hearing”.6 The next day
the Prime Minister confirmed his selection of Justice Nadon.7 On
October 7, 2013, Justice Nadon was officially sworn in as a member of
the Supreme Court of Canada.8 Later that day, Toronto lawyer Rocco
Galati launched a challenge to Justice Nadon’s appointment in the
Federal Court of Canada.9 On October 8, 2013, the Supreme Court
announced that Justice Nadon would not participate in matters before the
Supreme Court in light of the challenge to his appointment.10 Justice
Nadon and the Supreme Court were placed in limbo for the next
five months until the Court’s decision on March 21, 2014, which
declared his appointment to be void ab initio and the government’s
legislative amendments ultra vires.11

4

See Bill C-4, A second act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in
Parliament on March 21, 2013 and other measures (Economic Action Plan 2013 Act, No. 2), S.C.
2013, c. 40), ss. 471 and 472. Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26.
5
Press Release, “PM Announces Nominee for the Supreme Court of Canada”, September 30,
2013, online: <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2013/09/30/pm-announces-nominee-supreme-court-canada>.
6
The Committee is not, strictly speaking, a “parliamentary committee”. Rather, it is a
“committee of parliamentarians”. As discussed infra in Part II, this is a distinction with a difference.
The committee is composed of MPs but it is created not by Parliament, but by the executive, and
therefore it is not subject to the rules of Parliament, including parliamentary privilege. This
distinction is discussed in note 235 regarding MP Joe Comartin’s comments regarding Rothstein J. at
the October 2011 hearings for Justices Moldaver and Karakatsanis.
7
See Order in Council P.C. 2013-1050, referenced in Supreme Court Reference, supra,
note 3, at para. 9.
8
Supreme Court of Canada, News Release, October 7, 2013, online: <http://scccsc.lexum.com/scc-csc/news/en/item/4399/index.do>.
9
Supreme Court Reference, supra, note 3, at para. 9; Galati et al. v. The Right Honourable
Stephen Harper et al., Federal Court of Canada, File No. T-1657-13. See Sean Fine, “Justice Nadon
steps aside from Supreme Court until legal challenge resolved” The Globe and Mail (October 8,
2013), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/supreme-court-justices-appointmentchallenged-in-court/article14743436>.
10
Supreme Court of Canada, News Release, October 8, 2013, online: <http://
scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/news/en/item/4401/index.do>; Sean Fine, “Justice Nadon steps aside
while legal challenge heard” The Globe and Mail (October 9, 2013) A3; Tobi Cohen, “Supreme
Court appointment challenged; Judicial review; Activist lawyer argues Nadon not qualified”
National Post (October 9, 2013) A5.
11
Supreme Court Reference, supra, note 3.
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At the moment that Rocco Galati brought his legal challenge, it
should have been apparent that the appointment process had failed, at
least to the extent that it is supposed to serve a vetting function. Only
seven days had elapsed between the time that the Prime Minister announced Justice Nadon as his nominee on Monday, September 30, 2013
and Justice Nadon’s swearing in as a Supreme Court justice on Monday,
October 7, 2013.
The appointment process failed to adequately address the issue of
whether Justice Nadon was qualified for appointment to the high court
under the Supreme Court Act.12 This is obvious. However, the appointment process failed in at least three other respects. First, it constituted a
failure of transparency in several ways. The controversy following Justice Nadon’s appointment raised many unanswered questions about how
the appointments process operated: what were the qualifications upon
which candidates were selected and evaluated? How did the Minister of
Justice choose the so-called “long list” of candidates to be considered?
How many candidates were on this “long list”? How did the Supreme
Court Selection Panel operate? What was its mandate from the Minister
of Justice? How did the members decide on the recommendations for the
shortlist? Consensus? Unanimity? Majority vote?13
The appointment process also failed to produce accountability.
Neither the Minister of Justice nor the Prime Minister provided an adequate explanation of why they selected Justice Nadon for this important
post. This was unfair both to Justice Nadon and to the Canadian people.
The accountability failure is connected to the transparency failure: in the
absence of identifying the criteria for selection, it becomes impossible to
explain how a candidate meets those unknown criteria.14
Many questions have been raised about the Nadon appointment and
the Supreme Court Reference will no doubt be the subject of much discussion for years to come. It is not my intention or desire to dissect those

12

See Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, ss. 4-5.
We have learned more about the operation of the appointment process for Justice Nadon
through the Government’s response to Order Questions submitted by Irwin Cotler, MP and Stéphane
Dion in 2014. See Order Paper Question 73, House of Commons, Sessional Paper, 8555-412-74;
Order Paper Question 239, House of Commons, Sessional Paper 8555-412-239.
14
Cf. Carissima Mathen, “Choices and Controversy: Judicial Appointments in Canada”
(2007) 58 U.N.B.L.J. 52, at 71 [hereinafter “Mathen, ‘Choices and Controversy’”]: “The lack of
clarity around the most important criteria for our highest judges is unacceptable and demands
sustained and serious thought.”
13
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issues here.15 Rather, the Nadon appointment provides a useful vantage
point to gaze back and evaluate the changes to the Supreme Court
appointment process over the past decade.16
Thus, this paper analyzes the Supreme Court appointment process
over the 10-year period from 2004 through the end of 2013. The year
2004 has been selected because the vacancies caused by the departures of
Justices Iacobucci and Arbour in that year led to the beginning of a decade of reforms to the appointment process. The changes begun by Liberal
Minister of Justice Irwin Cotler in 2004 led to further reforms by the
Conservative government when it took office in 2006. Between 2004 and
2013, eight Supreme Court Justices have been appointed under variants
of a reformed appointment system: Rosalie Silverman Abella and Louise
Charron (2004), Marshall Rothstein (2006), Thomas Cromwell (2008),
Michael Moldaver and Andromache Karakatsanis (2011), Richard Wagner
(2012) and Marc Nadon (2013).17 In 2014, Justice LeBel is scheduled to
retire and we can anticipate a similar process being used as in the past
three appointments by Prime Minister Harper.
This paper conducts a democratic audit18 of the Supreme Court
appointment process19 and not an evaluation of the judges appointed
15

On the issues before the Court in the Supreme Court Reference, see Michael Plaxton &
Carissima Mathen, “Purposive Interpretation, Quebec, and the Supreme Court Act” (2013) 22:3
Const. Forum 15 (cited in the Supreme Court Reference, supra, note 3, at para. 58); Paul Daly,
“More on Section 6 of the Supreme Court Act: Legislative History and Purpose”, Administrative
Law Matters (October 16, 2013), online: <http://administrativelawmatters.blogspot.ca/2013/10/moreon-section-6-of-supreme-court-act.html>; House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and
Human Rights, 41st Parl., 2nd Sess., Tuesday November 19, 2013 (Evidence), online: <http://www.
parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=6307059&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=41&
Ses=2>; and Thursday November 21, 2013, online: <http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.
aspx?DocId=6317974&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=41&Ses=2>.
16
I do not think it is too early to conduct a retrospective of the reforms despite admonitions
to the contrary. As my colleague Carissima Mathen relates, Justice Rothstein was asked at his
hearing whether he thought the process was a good one. He replied: “You’re asking me whether I
think this is a good process. The question reminds me of a story. They say that shortly after the
Communist revolution in 1949 one of the Chinese leaders was asked whether he thought the French
Revolution was a success. His answer was that it was too early to tell. Perhaps I have to say it’s too
early to tell.” Parliament of Canada, Ad Hoc Committee to Review a Nominee for the Supreme Court
of Canada (February 27, 2006), quoted by Mathen, “Choices and Controversy”, supra, note 14, at
53, note 9.
17
The Supreme Court declared the appointment of Justice Nadon to the Supreme Court to be
void ab initio in the Supreme Court Reference, supra, note 3. However, the appointment is still
considered for purposes of evaluating the reforms to the appointment system between 2004 and 2013.
18
As discussed in Part III, infra, I take the concept of a “democratic audit” from William
Cross, “Foreword” in Ian Greene, The Courts (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006) vii, at vii.
19
I do not address the changes made by Minister of Justice Vic Toews in 2006 to the
Judicial Advisory Committees (“JACs”) that screen the pool of candidates for other federal
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through this process. Evaluating Supreme Court judges for their
supposed “merit” is an exercise fraught with difficulty, not the least
because of its subjectivity.20 It may also be more a matter of taste or
judgment than objective criteria.21 Moreover, as I discuss in Part III, the
process has largely failed to publicly articulate the criteria upon which
the judges are selected.22 In the absence of an articulation of the criteria
for appointment, those selected cannot be evaluated based on unknown
criteria. Thus, instead of evaluating the judges, I evaluate the process
used to select them through the idea of a democratic audit.
This paper has five parts in addition to this introduction. Part II
presents a short history of the Supreme Court appointments process
appointments. See Department of Justice Canada, Press Release, “Minister Toews pleased to
announce changes to Judicial Advisory Committees” (November 10, 2006); Canadian Judicial
Council, News Release, “Canadian Judicial Council calls on government to consult on proposed
changes” (November 9, 2006); Canadian Judicial Council, Press Release, “Judicial Appointments:
Perspective from the Canadian Judicial Council” (February 27, 2007); Canadian Bar Association,
News Release, “CBA Says Recent Changes to the Judicial Appointment Process Must Be Reversed”
(March 20, 2007); Canadian Association of Law Teachers, Press Release, “Canadian Association of
Law Teachers Reiterate its Position Concerning Reforms to Federal Judicial Appointments and
Criticizes Reforms Recently Envisaged by the Federal Minister of Justice” (November 29, 2006);
Rainer Knopff, “The Politics of Reforming Judicial Appointments” (2008) 58 U.N.B.L.J. 44; F.C.
DeCoste, “Howling at Harper” (2008) 58 U.N.B.L.J. 121; Peter Russell, “An Error of Judgment”
The Globe and Mail (February 27, 2007) A21. On the pre-reformed s. 96 appointment process, see
E. Neil McKelvey, “Foreword: Appointment of Section 96 Judges” (2008) 58 U.N.B.L.J. 5. See
generally Canadian Bar Association, Report of the Canadian Bar Association Committee on the
Appointment of Judges in Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Foundation, 1985).
20
Cf. Allan C. Hutchinson, “Looking for the Good Judge: Merit and Ideology” [hereinafter
“Hutchinson”] in Nadia Verrelli, ed., The Democratic Dilemma: Reforming Canada’s Supreme Court
(Montreal & Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 2013) 99 [hereinafter “Verrelli”].
21
Because of the nature of the work of the Supreme Court — a limited caseload, a long lag
time between hearings and decisions, the collegial nature of decision-making — I do not think that
one can begin to judge a Supreme Court judge until she or he has spent five years on the high court.
Thus, I think The Globe and Mail’s negative assessment of Justice Karakatsanis one year after her
appointment was grossly unfair. See Editorial, “Weak process for weighty choices” The Globe and
Mail (April 4, 2013) A16 (characterizing Justice Karakatsanis as “struggling to make an impact” and
being “a long way from pulling her judicial weight” because she had only written three decisions in
her 18 months on the high court). For responses, see Patrick LeSage & Susan Lang, “Both merit
praise” The Globe and Mail (April 5, 2013) A16: “We disagree with your criticism, both direct and
indirect, concerning the contributions of Justice Karakatsanis. … A judge’s contributions should not
be measured on the basis of the number of judgments written, particularly in an appellate court
where collegial decision-making and judgment-writing are so important”; Morris Chochla,
“Unwarranted” The Globe and Mail (April 10, 2013) A16: “Supreme Court Justice Andromache
Karakatsanis has superb qualifications and accomplishments. … Your criticism of Justice
Karakatsanis is unwarranted.”
22
An exception was Minister of Justice and Attorney General Irwin Cotler, who in 2004
publicly articulated the criteria upon which candidates were identified for the “long list” and the
criteria used to select the ultimate nominees for appointment. See infra , at 120-21.
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between 2004 and 2013. It sets out the mechanisms under which each of
the eight judicial appointments was made during this period.23 Part III
introduces the concept of a democratic audit and identifies the drivers of
change to the appointments process. It argues that prior to 1992 proposed
reforms to the Supreme Court amendment process were motivated by
concerns about federalism: incorporating a role for the provinces in the
appointment process. However, after the failure of the Charlottetown
Accord (1992), the motivation changed to concerns about the “democratic
deficit” so that reforming the Supreme Court appointment process became
part of a democratic reform agenda proposed first by the opposition
Reform Party, then by Liberal leader Paul Martin, both in his leadership
campaign and during his tenure as Prime Minister, and finally by the
Conservative Party led by Prime Minister Stephen Harper. This part also
addresses an issue that did not factor into the reforms: any perceived
deficiency in the quality of past appointments or concerns about the
legitimacy of the Supreme Court itself. Since 1992, the key factors that
were articulated as the basis for changing the appointment process have
been (1) transparency; (2) accountability; and (3) public knowledge about
the Supreme Court and its judges. These are the factors that I use for
evaluation through this democratic audit.
In Part IV, I conduct the democratic audit and find that the reforms have
largely failed to deliver on the promised transparency and accountability.
Conversely, I also conclude that the reforms have been very successful in
serving a public education function about the Supreme Court and the work
that Supreme Court judges do. Part V offers my recommendations for “reforming the reforms” in order to achieve the goals of transparency and
accountability in the appointment process. I argue that the government
should publish a detailed protocol to be styled Guide to Appointment of Supreme Court Justices, which would set out the qualifications, consultation to
be followed, procedure for evaluation, etc. I propose a revamped advisory
committee which would operate in a more open and transparent fashion and
produce a report on their work. The public hearings of nominees should continue, but only if the Minister of Justice also appears to answer questions
about the process and about why the nominee was selected. Finally, the paper ends with a brief conclusion in Part VI.24

23
There are actually only six appointment “events” to be evaluated since there were double
appointments in both 2004 (Abella and Charron) and 2011 (Karakatsanis and Moldaver).
24
This paper was written just after the Supreme Court Reference, supra, note 3 and prior to
the release of the Reference re Senate Reform, [2014] S.C.J. No. 32, 2014 SCC 32 (S.C.C.). It thus
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II. A SHORT HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT
APPOINTMENT PROCESS, 2004-2013
The 10-year period between 2004 and the end of 2013 produced
more changes to the appointment process for Supreme Court judges than
any period since the Court was created in 1875. Reform of the Supreme
Court appointment process began when Paul Martin became Prime
Minister in December 2002. As discussed below in this Part, Martin had
made reform of the Supreme Court appointment process part of his
Democratic Action Plan, both as a candidate to succeed Jean Chrétien as
the leader of the Liberal Party in 2002 and then as Prime Minister in 2003.
The changes were first implemented with the surprise announcements by
Justices Frank Iacobucci and Louise Arbour in the spring of 2004 that they
both intended to step down from the Court at the end of June.25
Prior to 2004, the appointment process was closed, secretive and
largely unknown and unknowable to the vast majority of Canadians.26
More was known about the process for electing a new Pope than about
the process for selecting a new Supreme Court justice. While vacancies
were publicly known — through the public announcement of a justice’s
retirement or, as in the case of Justice Sopinka, by a sudden death — no
information was publicly available about the selection process. The lack
of transparency caused some to believe that the process was partisan,27
understandably so since lack of information will lead to speculation, and
speculation about politics naturally leads to pondering about partisanship

does not consider the implications of these decisions on substantive reforms to the Supreme Court
amendment process. That issue is deserving of a separate, independent paper.
25
See Steven Edwards, “Arbour nomination confirmed: Supreme Court justice to be UN
Rights Commissioner” Ottawa Citizen (February 21, 2004) A3 and Tonda MacCharles, “Supreme
Court judge Iacobucci to retire; Two Ontario seats now open on bench Martin break replacement
promise” The Toronto Star (March 23, 2004) A6. Both announcements came as a surprise because
Justice Iacobucci could have served on the Court until 2012 and Justice Arbour until 2022. Justice
Iacobucci had served on the high court for 13 years and the announcement of his departure was less
surprising than that of Justice Arbour, who had served on the Court for less than five years at the time
she announced her resignation. See The Supreme Court of Canada, “The Honourable Mr. Justice
Frank Iacobucci”, online: <http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/court-cour/judges-juges/bio-eng.aspx?id
=frank-iacobucci> and The Supreme Court of Canada, “The Honourable Madam Justice Louise
Arbour”, online: <http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/court-cour/judges-juges/bio-eng.aspx?id=louise-arbour>.
26
Former Minister of Justice Irwin Cotler admitted that the consultative process for
Supreme Court appointments was “never well known — indeed, it may be said to have been
relatively unknown”. Cotler, “The Supreme Court Appointment Process”, supra, note 2, at 136.
27
Cotler, “The Supreme Court Appointment Process”, id.
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and patronage. Jacob Ziegel rightly described the process as one
“shrouded in vagueness, and unsubstantiated rumour and gossip”.28
In March 2004, Minister of Justice Irwin Cotler appeared before the
House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights
examining the Supreme Court appointment process and lifted the shroud
that had hidden the process from public view for so long.29 Minister
Cotler’s testimony was both historic and illuminating in shining significant light on the process.30 In his testimony, Cotler explained that
... what I would like to do now, in the interests of both transparency and
accountability, is to describe to you the consultative process or protocol
of consultation that is being used to select members of the Supreme
Court. I cannot claim, nor would I, that this consultative process or
protocol has always been followed in every particular. I can only
undertake to follow it as the protocol by which I will be governed as

28
Jacob S. Ziegel, “Merit Selection and Democratization of Appointments to the Supreme
Court of Canada” (June 1999) 5:2 Choices 3, at 6 [hereinafter “Ziegel, ‘Merit Selection’”]. Ziegel
posed many questions about the process:
Obviously, the Minister of Justice is involved and so, we are told, is the Prime Minister’s
Office, since by convention the Prime Minister makes the actual decision. If that is the
case, does the Cabinet do more than simply rubber stamp the Prime Minister’s choice?
What role does the Chief Justice of Canada play? To what extent does the Minister of
Justice confer with the attorney general or attorneys general of the province or the region
from which the candidate is to be appointed? What is the role of lobbyists for special
interests or on behalf of specific candidates? In the Charter era, how much attention does
the federal government pay to the constitutional philosophy of prospective appointees?
There are no sure answers to any of these questions.
Id. If someone as knowledgeable as Professor Ziegel did not know the answers to these questions,
we can assume that few experts and even fewer members of the public did.
29
The Committee itself described Cotler’s appearance as “the first time that [the Supreme Court
appointments process] had been made public. Canadians had their first opportunity to learn who was
consulted about Supreme Court appointments and the criteria by which candidates are assessed for their
fitness to be a Justice.” Canada, Report of the Standing Committee on Justice, Human Rights, Public Safety
and Emergency Preparedness, Improving the Supreme Court of Canada Appointments Process (Ottawa:
Communication Group, 2004), at 5 (Chair: Derek Lee, MP), online: Parliament of Canada,
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=
1350880&Language=E&Mode=
1&Parl=37&Ses=3>. See also Peter W. Hogg, “Appointment of Thomas A. Cromwell to the Supreme
Court of Canada” in J. Cameron, P. Monahan & B. Ryder, eds. (2009) 47 S.C.L.R. (2d) 413.
30
My colleague Carissima Mathen was less impressed with Mr. Cotler’s appearance. She
called the process
not exactly revealing. The Minister essentially offered assurances that Supreme Court
appointments were not random. They did not involve the equivalent of the Prime Minister
picking a name from a legal directory or appointing his favourite bridge partner. Instead,
the Prime Minister’s Office (through the Minister of Justice) talked with some people
about other people, gathered some names, looked over anything those people may have
written, and eventually made a decision. The candidates were not even interviewed.
Mathen, “Choices and Controversy”, supra, note 14, at 57 (citation omitted).

120

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d)

Minister of Justice. I might add that this is the first time that this protocol
or appointments protocol is being released, which I would say is yet
another expression of the beneficiary of this parliamentary review.
The first step taken in this appointments process is the identification of
prospective candidates. As you are aware, candidates come from the region
where the vacancy originated — be it the Atlantic, Ontario, Quebec, the
Prairies and the North, and British Columbia regions. This is a matter of
convention, except for Quebec, where the Supreme Court Act establishes a
requirement that three of the justices must come from Quebec.
The candidates are drawn from judges of the courts of jurisdiction in
the region, particularly the courts of appeal, as well as from senior
members of the bar and leading academics in the region. Sometimes,
names may be first identified through previous consultations
concerning other judicial appointments.
In particular, Mr. Chairman, the identification and assessment of
potential candidates is based on a broad range of consultations with
various individuals. As Minister of Justice, I consult with the
following: the Chief Justice of Canada and perhaps other members of
the Supreme Court of Canada, the chief justices of the courts of the
relevant region, the attorneys general of the relevant region, at least one
senior member of the Canadian Bar Association, and at least one senior
member of the law society of the relevant region.
I may also consider input from other interested persons, such as academics
and organizations who wish to recommend a candidate for consideration.
Anyone is free to recommend candidates, and indeed, some will choose to
do so by way of writing to the Minister of Justice, for example.
The second step is assessment of the potential candidates. Here, the
predominant consideration is merit. In consultation with the Prime
Minister, I use the following criteria, divided into three main categories:
professional capacity, personal characteristics, and diversity.
Let me begin with professional capacity. Under the heading of
professional capacity are the following considerations, and I will just
cite them: highest level of proficiency in the law, superior intellectual
ability and analytical and written skills; proven ability to listen and to
maintain an open mind while hearing all sides of the argument;
decisiveness and soundness of judgment; capacity to manage and share
consistently heavy workload in a collaborative context; capacity to
manage stress and the pressures of the isolation of the judicial role;
strong cooperative interpersonal skills; awareness of social context;
bilingual capacity; and specific expertise required for the Supreme
Court. Expertise can be identified by the court itself or by others.
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As I mentioned, Mr. Chairman, this goes to what might be called the
professional capacity. This is the comprehensive set of criteria here.
Not every candidate must have each of these criteria. This is the
composite set of criteria through which evaluation takes place.
[Translation]
Under the rubric of personal qualities, the following factors are
considered: impeccable personal and professional ethics, honesty,
integrity and forthrightness; respect and regard for others, patience,
courtesy, tact, humility, impartiality and tolerance; personal sense of
responsibility, common sense, punctuality and reliability.
The diversity criterion concerns the extent to which the court’s
composition adequately reflects the diversity of Canadian society.
[English]
Mr. Chairman, these are the criteria.
In reviewing the candidates, I may also consider jurisprudential profiles
prepared by the Department of Justice. These are intended to provide
information about the volume of cases written, areas of expertise, the
outcome of appeals of the cases, and the degree to which they have
been followed in the lower courts.
After the above assessments and consultations, as I’ve described, are
completed, I discuss the candidates with the Prime Minister. There may
also have been previous exchanges with the Prime Minister. Indeed,
I may be involved in a consultation more than once with a range of
persons with whom I’ve indicated that I engaged in consultations.
A preferred candidate is then chosen. The Prime Minister, in turn,
recommends a candidate to cabinet and the appointment proceeds by
way of an order in council appointment, as per the Constitution.
This concludes the description of the current protocol or appointment
31
process, which I’m sharing with you.

Cotler explained “the old process” at the same time as work was underway within government to reform it and create a new process for
appointing Supreme Court judges.
Cotler appeared before the House of Commons Standing Committee
on Justice, Human Rights, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness

31
Standing Committee on Justice, Human Rights, Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness, 37th Parl., 3rd Sess., March 30, 2004 (The Hon. Irwin Cotler), reproduced in Cotler,
“The Supreme Court Appointment Process”, supra, note 2.
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(“Justice Committee”) because earlier that month Prime Minister Paul
Martin’s Minister of Democratic Reform, the Honourable Jacques Saada,
asked that committee for “recommendations on how best to implement
prior review of Supreme Court of Canada Justices”.32 The Justice Committee also heard testimony from retired Supreme Court justice Claire
L’Heureux-Dubé and from academics. It produced a report that recommended that as an interim process the Minister of Justice appear before
the committee to explain both the process followed for filling the vacancies and the qualifications of the two nominees. The committee report
further recommended a more permanent process involving the creation
of an advisory committee composed of MPs from each official party, representation from the provinces, members of the judiciary, the legal
profession and lay members which would provide the Minister of Justice
with a shortlist of candidates for appointment. Again, the Minister of Justice would appear before the committee to explain both the process and
the appointee’s qualifications.33 Each of the Conservative Party, Bloc
Québécois and New Democratic Party (“NDP”) filed dissenting opinions
to the effect that the recommendations did not go far enough in various
respects.34
Initially, Prime Minister Martin announced that he intended to give
MPs a role in screening the nominees that he selected for the Supreme
Court.35 However, with a federal election intervening and pressure on the
government to have the vacancies filled by the end of the summer, the
federal government backtracked from its reform plans and put in place an
32
See Letter to Mr. Derek Lee, Chair, House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice,
Human Rights, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, March 16, 2004, online: <http://epe.lac-bac.
gc.ca/100/205/301/prime_minister-ef/paul_martin/06-02-03/www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news.asp@id=121>.
The letter asked the House Justice Committee to “undertake a review and report to the House of
Commons with recommendations on this matter as soon as possible. I would ask that you consult
with the Minister of Justice and parliamentarians from both Chambers as part of this review.” Id. See
also Office of the Prime Minister, News Release, “Parliament to Review Appointments” (March 16,
2004), online: <http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/205/ 301/prime_minister-ef/paul_martin/06-02-03/
www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news.asp@id=119>. The Justice Committee had previously begun looking at the
appointment process for all judicial appointments pursuant to a motion referred to the Justice
Committee from the House of Commons originally moved by Bloc Québécois MP and Justice
Committee member Richard Marceau. See Standing Committee on Justice, Human Rights, Public
Safety and Emergency Preparedness, 37th Parl., 3rd Sess., March 23, 2004 (Mr. Derek Lee, Chair).
33
See House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice, Human Rights, Public Safety
and Emergency Preparedness, Improving the Supreme Court of Canada Appointment Process (May
2004), 37th Parl. 3d Sess. (Mr. Derek Lee, Chair).
34
Id.
35
See Janice Tibbetts, “Martin determined to let MPS screen judges” National Post (May 17,
2004) A4.
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interim process as recommended by the Justice Committee whereby the
Prime Minister would select the nominees and the Minister of Justice
would appear before a committee of MPs.36
Thus, in August 2004, Minister of Justice Irwin Cotler appeared before an interim Ad Hoc Committee on the Appointment of Supreme
Court Judges to explain both the process that led to the Prime Minister’s
selection of Justices Abella and Charron as well as the basis for selecting
them.37 The committee was composed of seven MPs plus a representative
of the Canadian Judicial Council and the Law Society of Upper
Canada.38 The panel questioned Minister Cotler and prepared a report,
with dissenting opinions expressed about the process, not the nominees.
The Prime Minister then formally appointed Justices Abella and Charron
to the Supreme Court.39
In 2005, Cotler introduced a “permanent reform” process consisting
of four stages. In the first stage, the Minister was to conduct the same
sort of consultations and review as in the past with a view to creating a
“long list” of five to eight candidates. In the second stage, an Advisory
Committee was to assess the candidates and produce a confidential
short list of three names “along with a commentary of the strengths and

36
See Kim Lunman & Brian Laghi, “Commons panel to accept judges, but wants stronger
vetting process” The Globe and Mail (August 26, 2004) A1; Tonda MacCharles, “Naming process
draws fire; Justice minister to face special hearing today Charron, Abella picked for skills in public,
private law” The Toronto Star (August 25, 2004) A7; Kim Lunman & Michael Valpy, “MPs will
scrutinize top-court nominees” The Globe and Mail (August 24, 2004) A1; Kim Lunman, “MPs
working on hearings for top-court nominees” The Globe and Mail (August 23, 2004) A4. See
generally Irwin Cotler, P.C., M.P. & Charlie Feldman, “Supreme Court Appointments: When and
How Should Parliament Exercise Oversight?” (March 2014) 8 J.P.P.L. 253, at 267 [hereinafter
“Cotler & Feldman”].
37
Speaking Notes for Irwin Cotler Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, on
the Occasion of a Presentation to the Ad Hoc Committee on Supreme Court Appointments, August 24,
2004, Ottawa, online: <http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/webarchives/20071116083626/http://
www.canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/sp/2004/doc_31212.html>. The Minister appeared before an ad
hoc committee rather than a parliamentary committee because there had been a general election in
June 2004 and the 37th Parliament was dissolved on May 23, 2004. The 38th Parliament was not
summoned into session until October 4, 2004. See Parliament of Canada, PARLINFO, Parliaments,
online: <http://www.parl.gc.ca/parlinfo/Lists/Parliament.aspx>.
38
See Report of the Interim Ad Hoc Committee on the Appointment of Supreme Court
Judges, Appendix A, August 2004, online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/cp-pm/cr-rc/scj2jcs2/>. Chief Justice John Richard of the Federal Court of Appeal served as the Canadian Judicial
Council’s representative and Julian Porter served as the Law Society of Upper Canada’s
representative. See also Cotler & Feldman, supra, note 36, at 267-68.
39
See Report of the Interim Ad Hoc Committee on the Appointment of Supreme Court
Judges, Appendix A, id., and Kim Lunman, “Top-court nominees endorsed – but not by all” The
Globe and Mail (August 27, 2004) A5.
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weaknesses of each candidate” to the Minister. The Committee was also to provide the Minister with the complete record of consultations
and other material upon which it relied. The Minister could request the
Committee to undertake further consultations if the Minister felt they
were incomplete.40 In the third stage, the Prime Minister, with the
advice of the Minister of Justice, would select and appoint a candidate
from the short list.41 In the fourth stage, the Minister of Justice
would appear before a committee to explain both the process and the
selection.
The Liberals had the opportunity to put their plan into action when
Justice Major announced his retirement in August 2005, effective
Christmas Day later that year.42 Minister of Justice Irwin Cotler
consulted with the persons previously identified and created a list of
five to eight candidates which he sent to the Advisory Committee that
he created.43 The Advisory Committee was composed of four MPs (one
from each of the recognized political parties in the House of
Commons), one retired judge nominated by the Canadian Judicial
Council, one member nominated by the provincial Attorneys General in
the region, one member nominated by the provincial law societies in
the region and “two eminent people of recognized stature in the region”
nominated by the Minister of Justice of Canada. 44 Minister Cotler
apparently gave the Advisory Committee a mandate letter, “setting out

Cotler, “The Supreme Court Appointment Process”, supra, note 2, at 144-45.
Id., at 145. According to the protocol established by Minister Cotler, there was a proviso
for “exceptional circumstances” which would allow the government to select a candidate not on the
short list. Id.
42
See Supreme Court of Canada, News Release (August 3, 2005), online: <http://scccsc.lexum.com/scc-csc/news/en/item/2061/index.do>; and Cristin Schmitz, “Race begins after
resignation opens spot on Supreme Court” The Gazette (August 3 2005) A10.
43
Cotler, “The Supreme Court Appointment Process” supra, note 2, at 143. Elsewhere it is
asserted that Minister Cotler created a long list of eight candidates for the Justice Major vacancy. See
Ben Alarie & Andrew Green, “Policy Preference Change and Appointments to the Supreme Court of
Canada” (2009) 47 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1, at para. 7 [hereinafter “Alarie & Green, ‘Policy Preference’”].
44
Cotler, id., at 143; Canada, Department of Justice, News Release, “New Supreme Court
of Canada Appointments Process Launched” (August 8, 2005), online: <http://www.collections
canada.gc.ca/webarchives/20071116083829/http://www.canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/nr/2005/doc_3
1586.html>. For the members of the Advisory Committee see Canada, Department of Justice, News
Release, “Minister of Justice Announces Members of New Advisory Committee for Next Supreme
Court Appointment” (October 11, 2005), online: <http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/webarchives/
20071116092711/http://www.canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/nr/2005/doc_31640.html> and Canada,
Department of Justice, Backgrounder, “Members of the Advisory Committee on Supreme Court of
Canada Appointments” (October 11, 2005), online: <http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/webarchives/
20071116092120/http://www.canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/nr/2005/doc_31642.html>.
40
41

(2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d)

REFORMING THE APPOINTMENT PROCESS

125

the objectives of the Committee, describing the merit-based criteria,
establishing timeframes and providing for a general procedure,
particularly in relation to confidentiality”.45 Cotler also apparently met
with the Committee before it began its work. 46
The Advisory Committee shortened the list to three names after
reviewing the résumés and publications of the candidates and consulting
with third parties (the same persons the Minister had consulted with
earlier). The committee submitted its list to Minister of Justice Cotler,
but the Liberal government fell at the end of November 2005 and after an
election in January 2006, the Conservative Party led by Stephen Harper
formed the government. The new Harper government chose Justice
Rothstein from the shortlist but, in a deviation from the Liberal plan, had
the nominee appear, instead of the Minister of Justice, before an ad hoc
parliamentary committee.47
Justice Rothstein thus became the first nominee ever to appear for a
public hearing prior to being appointed to the Supreme Court. He
appeared not before a parliamentary committee but before an ad hoc
committee of parliamentarians composed of MPs from the political parties in proportion to their representation in the House. 48 Professor Peter

45

Cotler, id., at 143-44.
Id., at 144.
47
Prime Minister’s Office, News Release, “Supreme Court nominee to face questions from
Parliamentarians” (February 20, 2006), online: <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1025>; Prime
Minister’s Office, News Release, “Prime Minister Harper announces nominee for Supreme Court
appointment” (February 23 2006), online: <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2006/02/23/prime-ministerharper-announces-nominee-supreme-court-appointment>. Minister of Justice Toews (as he then was)
was present at the hearing but he did not take questions from the parliamentarians. He explained the
process and the basis for the Prime Minister’s selection of Justice Rothstein. I am not enamoured of
the nomenclature “parliamentary hearing” to describe the questioning of Justice Rothstein and of
successive nominees. The hearing involves parliamentarians but it is not governed in any way by the
rules of Parliament, and the term gives the misleading impression that Parliament as an institution
has some role in the process. The process is accurately described as “ad hoc” and, given the function
that the hearings have served to date, the participants needed not be parliamentarians. Indeed, for
reasons described in Part IV, the composition of the ad hoc committees has been problematic
because of the overlap in membership between the selection/advisory committees and the ad hoc
committees. The “parliamentary hearings” have been more akin to a television interview than to a
parliamentary hearing.
48
Prime Minister’s Office, News Release, “Prime Minister announces appointment of
Mr. Justice Marshall Rothstein to the Supreme Court” (March 1, 2006), online: <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/
media.asp?id=1041>; Donald R Songer, The Transformation of the Supreme Court of Canada:
An Empirical Examination (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), at 18 [hereinafter
“Songer”].
46
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Hogg supervised the proceedings, providing introductory comments
“on the limits of judicial speech”, in order to guide the committee “as
to the kinds of questions that could or could not be answered by the
nominee”.49 The members of the committee were free to ask Justice
Rothstein any questions, but as per Professor Hogg’s admonitions, they
were aware that Justice Rothstein had the prerogative to decline to answer questions involving issues that could be put before him on the
Supreme Court.
The three-hour hearing was televised live and was widely considered a tame affair, in part due to Justice Rothstein’s amiable personality
and self-deprecating style.50 The committee did not vote on the
appointment and did not produce a report, although Minister of Justice
Vic Toews did invite the MPs to share their views with the Prime
Minister, who reportedly watched the proceedings on television. The
Prime Minister confirmed Justice Rothstein’s appointment two days
after the hearing.51
Two years elapsed before the Harper government would have
another chance to fill a vacancy on the high court. In the interim, it did
not make any formal policies or issue any plans on how it would
approach the appointment process. This became apparent after April 9,
2008, when Justice Michel Bastarache announced that he would be
stepping down from the Supreme Court, effective June 30, 2008. 52
More than six weeks later, the Minister of Justice announced the
following process to replace Justice Bastarache. First, the Minister of
Justice and Attorney General would consult with the Attorneys General
of the four Atlantic provinces as well as leading members of the legal

Peter W. Hogg, “Appointment of Justice Marshall Rothstein to the Supreme Court
of Canada” (2006) 44 Osgoode Hall L.J. 527, at 528, 531 [hereinafter “Hogg, ‘Appointment of
Justice Marshall Rothstein’”]. A copy of Hogg’s opening remarks to the Committee is appended
to his 2006 article. See also House of Commons, Ad Hoc Committee to Review a Nominee
for the Supreme Court of Canada, News Release (Transcript), (February 27 2006), online:
<http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/webarchives/20071125225650/http://www.justice.gc.ca/en/ne
ws/sp/2006/doc_31772_1.html>.
50
For critical comments on the Justice Rothstein hearing, see Mathen, “Choices and
Controversy”, supra, note 14, and Michael Plaxton, “The Neutrality Thesis and the Rothstein
Hearing” (2008) 58 U.NB.L.J. 92 [hereinafter “Plaxton, ‘The Neutrality Thesis’”].
51
Prime Minister’s Office, News Release, “Prime Minister announces appointment of
Mr. Justice Marshall Rothstein to the Supreme Court” (March 1, 2006), online: <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/
media.asp?id=1041>; Songer, supra, note 48, at 18.
52
Supreme Court of Canada, News Release (April 9, 2008), online: <http://scc-csc.lexum.com/
scc-csc/news/en/item/2798/index.do>.
49
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community. Members of the public were invited to submit their input
through a Department of Justice website. Based on this process, the
Minister would prepare a list of an unspecified number of qualified
candidates which would be reviewed by a selection panel composed of
five MPs — including two Members from the government caucus and
one member from each of the recognized Opposition caucuses, as
selected by their respective leaders. This body — known for the first
time as “the Supreme Court Selection Panel” — was tasked with the
responsibility for assessing the candidates and providing an unranked
short list of three qualified candidates to the Prime Minister of Canada
and the Minister of Justice for their consideration. Finally, the nominee
was to appear at a public hearing of an ad hoc parliamentary
committee, as did Justice Rothstein.53
The Minister of Justice completed his consultations and submitted
his list of qualified candidates to the Supreme Court Selection Panel.
That body was beset by partisan bickering and on September 5, 2008, the
Prime Minister bypassed the panel and announced Justice Cromwell as
the nominee for appointment. The Prime Minister stated that an appointment would not be made until Justice Cromwell appeared at a public
hearing of an ad hoc parliamentary committee.54 Two days later, the
Prime Minister asked the Governor General to dissolve Parliament, triggering an election October 14, 2008. Soon after Parliament reconvened
in November, Canada was beset by a parliamentary crisis and on
December 4, 2008, the Governor General prorogued Parliament at the
Prime Minister’s request.55 Prime Minister Harper dispensed with the
parliamentary hearing and on December 22, 2008, he formally appointed
Justice Cromwell to the Supreme Court.56 Given fractious and fragile
parliamentary relations and the wide support for Justice Cromwell, there

53
Department of Justice of Canada, News Release, “Minister of Justice Announces
Selection Process for the Supreme Court of Canada” (May 28, 2008), online: <http://www.
marketwired.com/press-release/minister-of-justice-announces-selection-process-for-the-supreme-court-ofcanada-862003.htm>.
54
Prime Minister of Canada, Press Release, “PM Announces Nominee for Supreme Court
Appointment” (September 5, 2008), online: <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2008/09/05/pm-announcesnominee-supreme-court-appointment>.
55
See generally Peter H. Russell & Lorne M. Sossin, eds., Parliamentary Democracy in
Crisis (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009).
56
Government of Canada, News Release, “Prime Minister Harper announces appointment
of Thomas Cromwell to Supreme Court of Canada” (December 22, 2008).
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was minimal criticism of the Prime Minister’s dispensing with the process
for parliamentary consultation and hearing.57
On May 13, 2011, a newly re-elected Conservative government was
suddenly faced with two vacancies. Justices Ian Binnie and Louise Charron
jointly announced their retirement on what would otherwise have been a
sleepy post-election Friday afternoon.58 The Prime Minister instituted the
following process. First, the Minister of Justice and Attorney General
would consult with the Attorney General of Ontario as well as leading
members of the legal community in order to identify a pool of qualified
candidates for appointment to the Supreme Court. Members of the public
were invited to submit their input regarding candidates through a
Department of Justice website. Based on this process, the Minister of
Justice would create a list of unspecified numbers of qualified candidates.
Second, this “long list” of qualified candidates would be reviewed by a
selection panel composed of five MPs: three government MPs and one
from each of the opposition parties, the NDP and the Liberals, as selected
by the leaders of those parties. The Supreme Court Selection Panel was
tasked with assessing the candidates and providing an unranked short list
of six qualified candidates to the Prime Minister and the Minister of
Justice for their consideration. Third, while it was unstated, it was
implied that the Prime Minister and Minister of Justice would only make
a selection of a “nominee” from this shortlist. Fourth, the selected
“nominees” would appear at a public hearing of ad hoc parliamentary
committee to answer questions from MPs as Justice Rothstein had done
in 2006.59
This process was followed in 2011 for the appointments of Justices
Moldaver and Karakatsanis,60 in 2012 for the appointment of Justice
See, e.g., Janice Tibbetts, “Justice can no longer be delayed” Edmonton Journal
(December 23, 2008) A7; Kirk Makin, “Top-court appointment process bypasses review process”
The Globe and Mail (December 23, 2008) A4; Editorial, “Hurry, without hearing” The Globe and
Mail (December 23, 2008) A14; Editorial, “Harper abandons zeal for reform” The Toronto Star
(December 26, 2008) A57; David Asper, “Picking the lesser evil” National Post (December 27,
2008) A25.
58
See Supreme Court of Canada, “News Release” (May 13, 2011), online: <http://scccsc.lexum.com/scc-csc/news/en/item/3701/index.do>; Prime Minister of Canada, “Statement by the
Prime Minister of Canada on the Upcoming Retirement of Two Supreme Court Judges” (May 13,
2011), online: <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2011/05/13/statement-prime-minister-canada-upcomingretirement-two-supreme-court-judges> [hereinafter “Prime Minister of Canada, ‘Upcoming
Retirement’”]. The announcement was surprising because Justice Binnie did not have to retire until
2014 and Justice Charron until 2026.
59
Prime Minister of Canada, “Upcoming Retirement”, id.
60
Id.
57
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Wagner61 and in 2013 for the appointment of Justice Nadon.62 The Office
of Federal Judicial Affairs — the body that oversees and administers federal judicial appointments — administers the appointment process, at
least respecting the Selection Panel.63 It is not clear what role the Office
of Federal Judicial Affairs plays in compiling the long list. In each of
those appointments, the hearing took place two days after the Prime Minister’s announcement of the nominee. In 2011, Professor Peter Hogg
reprised the role of counsel to the parliamentary committee that he had
performed in 2006 at the Rothstein hearing. In both 2012 and 2013, former Quebec Court of Appeal Justice Jean-Louis Baudouin exercised this
function. The day after each of these hearings, the Prime Minister formally appointed his nominee to the Supreme Court.64
Thus, as seen in Table 1, between 2004 and 2013, various appointment processes were used. However, since 2011, the Government seems
to have settled on a process involving a “Supreme Court Selection Panel”
consisting of five MPs and an ad hoc committee of MPs which questions
the “nominee” at a public hearing.
61
Prime Minister of Canada, “Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on the Retirement of
Justice Marie Deschamps” (May 18, 2012), online: <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2012/05/18/ statementprime-minister-canada-retirement-justice-marie-deschamps> [hereinafter “Prime Minister of Canada,
‘Justice Marie Deschamps’”].
62
Prime Minister of Canada, “Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on the Retirement
of Justice Morris Fish” (April 23, 2013), online: <http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2013/04/23/
statement-prime-minister-canada-retirement-justice-morris-fish> [hereinafter “Prime Minister of Canada,
‘Justice Morris Fish’”].
63
According to the Federal Judicial Affairs website, “The Minister of Justice has given FJA
the mandate to administer the Supreme Court of Canada Appointments Selection Panel process,
established to evaluate candidates for appointment to the Supreme Court of Canada.” Office of the
Commissioner of Federal Judicial Affairs, “Our Role”, online: <http://www.fja-cmf.gc.ca/fja-cmf/
role-eng.html>.
64
Strictly speaking, Supreme Court judges are appointed by the Governor in Council. See
Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, s. 4(2). The Governor in Council is the Governor General
acting on the advice of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada, i.e., the federal cabinet. See
Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s. 13 (reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5).
See generally Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. Supp. (Toronto: Carswell,
2007), at § 9.4(b) [hereinafter “Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada”]. The Prime Minister advises
the Governor General on behalf of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada. It has become clear that
the choice of all Supreme Court judges is the personal prerogative of the Prime Minister. See
A. Anne McLellan, “Foreword” (2000) 38 Alta. L. Rev. 603, at 604 [hereinafter “McLellan,
‘Foreword’”]; Cotler, “The Supreme Court Appointment Process”, supra, note 2; and Tonda
MacCharles, “Supreme Court pick defends qualifications: Justice Marc Nadon concedes he doesn’t
meet any diversity expectations for upper chamber” The Toronto Star (October 3, 2013) A28 (stating
that Justice Minister Peter MacKay noted that the selection of Supreme Court justices was the
decision of the Prime Minister) [hereinafter “MacCharles, ‘Supreme Court pick defends
qualifications’”].
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Table 1: Modes of Appointment of Supreme Court Judges
2004–2013
Judge (Year)

Advisory Committee

Public Hearing

Abella and
Charron (2004)

No

Yes. Minister of Justice
appeared before ad hoc
committee.

Rothstein (2006)

Yes. 4 MPs, 1
provincial rep, 1
retired judge, 1 Law
Society rep, 2 public

Yes. Nominee
appeared before
ad hoc committee
of parliamentarians
and judicial and law
society representatives.

Cromwell (2008)

No

No

Karakatsanis
and Moldaver
(2011)

Yes. 5 MPs
(3 Conservative,
1 NDP, 1 Liberal)

Yes. Nominees
appeared before
ad hoc committee
of MPs.

Wagner (2012)

Yes. 5 MPs
(3 Conservative,
1 NDP, 1 Liberal)

Yes. Nominee appeared
before ad hoc
committee of MPs.

Nadon (2013)

Yes. 5 MPs
(3 Conservative,
1 NDP, 1 Liberal)

Yes. Nominee appeared
before ad hoc
committee of MPs.

Others

Prime
Minister had
intended to
proceed with
both advisory
committee and
public hearing

III. DEMOCRATIC AUDIT AND DRIVERS OF CHANGE
1. The Concept of a Democratic Audit
The concept of a democratic audit of Canadian political institutions
was conceived by a group of political scientists in the first decade of the
21st century in response to two apparently contradictory phenomena: the
increasing identification of a “democratic deficit” among political leaders, government commissions, academics, citizen groups and the media,
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and the continued veneration of Canadian democracy around the world.65
Led by Professor William Cross, Bell Chair for the Study of Canadian
Parliamentary Democracy at Carleton University, the Canadian Democratic
Audit series audited Canadian federalism,66 legislatures,67 cabinets and
first ministers,68 citizens,69 elections,70 political parties,71 advocacy
groups,72 communications technology,73 and the courts.74
The participants in the Canadian Democratic Audit selected participation, inclusiveness and responsiveness as the audit benchmarks to
evaluate the particular feature of Canadian democracy.75 They chose
these benchmarks based on normative considerations of the meaning of
democracy that they believed were relevant to Canada in the 21st century.
In defending their choice of the above three benchmarks, they explained:
“We believe that any contemporary definition of Canadian democracy
must include institutions and decision-making practices that are defined
by public participation, that this participation must include all Canadians,
and that government outcomes must respond to the views of Canadians.”76
While these benchmarks are instructive, I do not adopt them for purposes of my “audit” of changes to the Supreme Court appointment
process over the past decade. Rather, I am inspired by the idea and the
methodology of the democratic audit. Instead, I have selected the following three benchmarks: (1) transparency; (2) accountability; and (3) the
promotion of public knowledge about the work of the Supreme Court of
Canada and its judges.

65
See William Cross, “Foreword” in Ian Greene, The Courts (Vancouver: UBC Press,
2006) vii, at vii [hereinafter “Greene, The Courts”]. This Foreword is contained in each of the nine
substantive volumes of The Canadian Democratic Audit Series identified in notes 66-74, infra. See
generally William Cross, “Constructing the Canadian Democratic Audit” in William Cross, ed.,
Auditing Canadian Democracy (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010) 1 at 1-11.
66
Jennifer Smith, Federalism (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004).
67
David Docherty, Legislatures (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005).
68
Graham White, Cabinets and First Ministers (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005).
69
Elizabeth Gidengil et al., Citizens (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004).
70
John Courtney, Elections (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004).
71
William Cross, Political Parties (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004).
72
Lisa Young & Joanna Everitt, Advocacy Groups (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004).
73
Darin Barney, Communication Technology (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005).
74
See Ian Greene, The Courts (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006).
75
William Cross, “Constructing the Canadian Democratic Audit” in William Cross, ed.,
Auditing Canadian Democracy (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010) 1, at 1.
76
William Cross, “Foreword” in Ian Greene, The Courts, supra, note 65, at vii. This
Foreword is contained in each of the nine substantive volumes of The Canadian Democratic Audit
Series identified in notes 66-74, supra.
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I have selected transparency and accountability because these values
were and continue to be the dominant factors, concerns about which precipitated changes to the appointment process and that continue to be used
to justify those changes, as expressed in the statement by Prime Minister
Harper in the quote at the beginning of this paper.77 For example, in announcing the members of the Selection Panel to advise on the appointment
to fill the vacancy created by Justice Fish’s retirement in 2013, the Justice
Canada News Release stated: “The Selection Panel plays a critical role in
ensuring transparency and balance in the Supreme Court appointment process.”78 The exact same language was used in 2012 upon the retirement of
Justice Deschamps,79 and in 2011 upon the retirement of Justices Binnie
and Charron.80 I am not alone in asserting that the reforms were intended
to increase transparency and accountability.81
As discussed in Part III.4, promoting public knowledge about the
work of the Supreme Court of Canada and its judges was not a causal
factor in precipitating the changes ushered in by the Martin government
and continued by the Harper government. However, since 2004, it has
been invoked as an explanatory factor for the changes. Thus, when Peter
Hogg opened the proceedings for MPs to interview Justice Rothstein in
February 2006, he stated that the purpose of the new process was “to
make appointments to the Court more open, and to promote public

77
News Release, “Prime Minister announces appointment of Mr. Justice Marshall Rothstein
to the Supreme Court” (March 1, 2006), online: <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2006/03/01/prime-ministerannounces-appointment-mr-justice-marshall-rothstein-supreme-court> [hereinafter “Appointment of
Mr. Justice Marshall Rothstein”]: “The way in which Justice Rothstein was appointed marks an
historic change in how we appoint judges in this country. It brought unprecedented openness and
accountability to the process. The hearings allowed Canadians to get to know Justice Rothstein
through their members of Parliament in a way that was not previously possible.”
78
Justice Canada, News Release: “Minister of Justice Announces Members of the Supreme
Court of Canada Selection Panel” (June 11 2013), online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/newsnouv/nr-cp/2013/doc_32908.html>.
79
Justice Canada, News Release, “Minister of Justice Announces Members of the Supreme
Court of Canada Selection Panel” (August 8, 2012), online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/news-nouv/
nr-cp/2012/doc_32776.html>.
80
Justice Canada, News Release, “Minister of Justice Announces Members of the Supreme
Court of Canada Selection Panel” (August 5, 2011), online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/newsnouv/ja-nj/2011/doc_32624.html>.
81
See Plaxton, “The Neutrality Thesis”, supra, note 50, at 97 (asserting that the new
appointments process was supposed to generate greater transparency and accountability); Lorne
Sossin, “Judicial Appointment, Democratic Aspirations, and the Culture of Accountability” (2008)
58 U.N.B.L.J. 11, at 33 (stating that the hearing process created by Prime Minister Harper in 2006
ensures that there is a forum for political accountability to play a role in the appointments process)
[hereinafter “Sossin, ‘Judicial Appointment’”].
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knowledge of the judges of the Court”.82 And when after those hearings,
the Prime Minister formally announced the appointment of Justice Rothstein
to the Court, the Prime Minister stated that “[t]he hearings allowed
Canadians to get to know Justice Rothstein through their members of
Parliament in a way that was not previously possible”.83 Similar statements were repeated in the appointments of 2011, 2012 and 2013.84
Other benchmarks could have been chosen for this audit, such as
representativeness,85 bilingualism,86 provincial participation,87 parliamentary oversight,88 “merit”,89 or enhancing the legitimacy of the Supreme
Peter W. Hogg, “Notes for opening remarks to Ad Hoc Committee to Review a Nominee
for the Supreme Court of Canada”, February 27, 2006, reproduced in Appendix to Peter W. Hogg,
“Appointment of Justice Marshall Rothstein”, supra, note 49, at 537-38.
83
“Appointment of Mr. Justice Marshall Rothstein”, supra, note 77.
84
See Moldaver & Karakatsanis Transcript (2011) [hereinafter “Moldaver & Karakatsanis
Transcript”]; Wagner Transcript (2012) [hereinafter “Wagner Transcript”]; and Nadon Transcript
(2013) [hereinafter “Nadon Transcript”].
85
Cf. Lorne Sossin, “Should Canada Have a Representative Supreme Court?” [hereinafter
“Sossin, ‘Representative Supreme Court”] in Verrelli, supra, note 20, 27; Sossin, “Judicial Appointment”,
supra, note 81; Indigenous Bar Association, “Respecting Legal Pluralism in Canada: Indigenous Bar
Association Appeals to Harper Government to Appoint an Aboriginal Justice to the Supreme Court of
Canada” in Verrelli, supra, note 20, 65; Indigenous Bar Association, “Indigenous Bar Association Urges
Prime Minister Harper to Remove Barriers to Judicial Appointments for Indigenous Judges” in Verelli, id.,
67; Sonia Lawrence, “Reflections on Judicial Diversity and Judicial Independence” in Adam Dodek &
Lorne Sossin, eds., Judicial Independence in Context (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010); K.D. Ewing, “A Theory
of Democratic Adjudication: Towards a Representative, Accountable and Independent Judiciary” (2000)
38 Alta. L. Rev. 708; Richard Devlin, A. Wayne Mackay & Natasha Kim, “Reducing the Democratic
Deficit: Representation, Diversity and the Canadian Judiciary, or Towards a ‘Triple P’ Judiciary” (2000) 38
Alta. L. Rev 734 [hereinafter “Devlin, Mackay & Kim”]; Ian Peach, “Legitimacy on Trial: A Process for
Appointing Justices to the Supreme Court of Canada”, Saskatchewan Institute of Public Policy, Public
Policy Paper 30 (February 2005) 9 [hereinafter “Peach”]; Isabel Grant & Lynn Smith, “Gender
Representation in the Canadian Judiciary” in Ontario Law Reform Commission, Appointing Judges:
Philosophy, Politics and Practice (Toronto: Ontario Law Reform Commission, 1991) 57.
86
Cf. Sébastien Grammond & Mark Power, “Should Supreme Court Judges be Required to
be Bilingual?” in Verrelli, supra, note 20, 49; Sossin, “Representative Supreme Court”, id., at 43-44;
Parliament of Canada, Bilingualism of Supreme Court Judges (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 2011);
Philip Slayton, Mighty Judgment: How the Supreme Court of Canada Runs Your Life (Toronto:
Allen Lane, 2011), at 250-52 [hereinafter “Slayton”].
87
Cf. Erin Crandall, “Intergovernmental Relations and the Supreme Court of Canada: The
Changing Place of the Provinces in Judicial Selection Reform” [hereinafter “Crandall”] in Verrelli, supra,
note 20, 71; F.C. DeCoste, “The Jurisprudence of ‘Canada’s Fundamental Values’ and Appointment to the
Supreme Court of Canada” in Verrelli, supra, note 20, 87 [hereinafter “DeCoste, “The Jurisprudence””];
and Eugénie Brouillet & Yves Tanguay, “The Legitimacy of Constitutional Arbitration in a Multinational
Federative System: The Case of the Supreme Court of Canada” in Verrelli, supra, note 20, 126.
88
See Irwin Cotler, P.C., M.P. & Charlie Feldman, “Supreme Court Appointments: When
and How Should Parliament Exercise Oversight?” (March 2014) 8 J.P.P.L. 253.
89
Cf. Janice Tibbetts, “Judge wants merit to be criteria for supreme job” The Edmonton
Journal (March 4, 1999) A10; R. Foot, “Retired high court judge opposes calls for reform” National
Post (October 28, 1999); Peach, supra, note 85; Hutchinson, supra, note 20.
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Court.90 Others have argued strenuously that the entire appointment process should be overhauled to make it more independent of government
and provide checks and balances in the appointment process.91 However,
these are all normative claims regarding what the appointment process
should be about. My goal in this paper is to assess the reforms based on
what those who control and shape the process have claimed they are
about. As set out below, the clear intention of the reforms was to enhance
transparency and accountability in the appointment process and, secondarily, to increase understanding of Supreme Court justices and their
work.
2. Federalism and the Era of Mega-Constitutional Politics,
1875–1992
When Parliament created the Supreme Court in 1875, it vested the
power of appointment of Supreme Court justices with the federal Cabinet.92 This decision was consistent with the prevailing political values of
the time and the desire of the Fathers of Confederation to centralize power in a strong central government.
The Supreme Court was a controversial institution from the moment
of its creation. It was the subject of much criticism which even involved
appeals for its abolition.93 The quality of appointments frequently came
under attack, especially for patronage.94 With abolition of appeals to the
90

Cf. Peach, id.
Peter Russell and Jacob Ziegel have been the most notable proponents of this view. See e.g.,
Peter H. Russell, “Conclusion” in Kate Malleson & Peter H. Russell, eds., Appointing Judges in an Age
of Judicial Power: Critical Perspectives from Around the World (Toronto: University of Toronto Press)
420; Jacob S. Ziegel, “A New Era in the Selection of Supreme Court Judges?” (2006) 44 Osgoode Hall L.J.
547; Jacob S. Ziegel, “Appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada” (1994) 5 Const. Forum 10; and
Ziegel, “Merit Selection”, supra, note 28. See also F.L. Morton, “Judicial Appointments in Post-Charter
Canada: A System in Transition” in Kate Malleson & Peter H. Russell, eds., id., 56.
92
Strictly speaking, Supreme Court judges are appointed by the Governor in Council. See
Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, s. 4(2). The Governor in Council is the Governor General
acting on the advice of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada, i.e., the federal Cabinet. See
Constitution Act, 1867, s. 13. See generally Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, supra,
note 64, at § 9.4(b). The Prime Minister advises the Governor General on behalf of the Queen’s
Privy Council for Canada. It has become clear that the choice of all Supreme Court judges is the
personal prerogative of the Prime Minister. See supra, note 64.
93
See James G. Snell & Frederick Vaughn, The Supreme Court of Canada: History of the
Institution (Toronto: Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 1985) 28 [hereinafter “Snell &
Vaughn”].
94
Snell & Vaughn, id., at 82-85, 119; Ian Bushnell, The Captive Court (Montreal &
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1992) at 115.
91
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Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 1949, the Supreme Court
became truly supreme and calls to reform the appointment process by
giving the provinces or the Senate some role began.95 However, formal
proposals to reform the appointments process began in earnest during the
era of Canadian mega-constitutional politics which coincides with the
ascension of Pierre Trudeau as Prime Minister in 1968.
In 1968, Prime Minister Pearson published a policy statement entitled Federalism for the Future.96 It identified the Supreme Court as one
of the central institutions of Canadian federalism and stated a willingness to discuss questions relating to the “composition, jurisdiction and
procedures” of the Supreme Court at future constitutional meetings as
part of any review of the Canadian Constitution. 97 Later that year, Pierre
Trudeau became Prime Minister and issued his own policy statement,
which became a blueprint for his inaugural first ministers’ conference in
1969.98 Trudeau’s policy statement squarely identified “the manner of
selection of the members of the Court” as an item for reform and constitutional entrenchment. According to Trudeau, “[j]udges should not be
regarded as representatives of several different governments which
could conceivably be allowed to appoint them.” Thus, Trudeau proposed
that there be “some form of participation” by the provinces in the
appointment process. Moreover, Trudeau suggested that nominations
for potential appointees could be submitted to a reformed Senate for
approval.99
The entrenchment of the Supreme Court in the Constitution and provincial participation in the selection of its judges thus became part of
constitutional discussions and proposals from 1969 until 1992: provisions were included in the Victoria Charter (1971),100 Bill C-60

95
Snell & Vaughn, id., at 194, 204; Peter H. Russell, The Supreme Court of Canada as a
Bilingual and Bicultural Institution (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1969), at 44-45.
96
The Rt. Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Prime Minister of Canada, Federalism for the
Future: A Statement of Policy by the Government of Canada (1968), reproduced in Anne F.
Bayefsky, Canada’s Constitutional Act 1982 & Amendments: A Documentary History, vol. 1
(Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1989) 61 [hereinafter “Bayefsky”].
97
Id., at 68.
98
See The Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada, The
Constitution and the People of Canada: An Approach to the Objectives of Confederation, the Rights
of People and the Institutions of Government (1968), reproduced in Bayefsky, supra, note 96, at 78.
99
Id., at 88-89.
100
Canadian Constitutional Charter, 1971 (The Victoria Charter) articles 22-42, reproduced
in Bayefsky, supra, note 96, at 215-17.
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(1978),101 the report of the Pepin-Robarts Commission (1979),102 as well
as on the agenda during most of the constitutional conferences in the
1970s.103 However, during the intense constitutional negotiations of
1980-1981, the Supreme Court fell off the constitutional agenda,104
except respecting the amending formula. Thus, when the Constitution
was patriated and the Constitution Act, 1982 enacted, the only mention of
the Supreme Court was contained in Part V of that Act under the amending formula.105
Entrenching the Supreme Court and reforming the appointment process
re-emerged on the constitutional agenda in the Meech Lake Accord
(1987)106 and in the Charlottetown Accord (1992).107 In both cases, the proposals would have empowered the relevant provinces to submit names of
nominees to the Prime Minister. The proposed reforms during this era were
confined to giving the provinces a larger and formal role in the appointment
process. Federalism concerns soon fell off the reform agenda for the Supreme Court as new concerns began to dominate the political discourse.108
3. The Democratic Deficit and Democratic Reform, 1993–2004
With the defeat of the Charlottetown Accord in the October 1992 referendum, the era of mega-constitutional politics ended. In the 1993
election that brought Jean Chrétien and the Liberals to power, the Reform
Party took Ottawa by storm. Although it fell two seats short of forming
101
Bill C-60, The Constitutional Amendment Bill, 30th Parl., 3rd Sess. (June 20, 1978),
ss. 100-115, reproduced in Bayefsky, id., at 387-93.
102
Task Force on Canadian Unity, A Future Together: Observations and Recommendations
(Hull, QC: Minister of Supply and Services, 1979).
103
See Bayefsky, supra, note 96, at 309-40, 437-529, 537-85.
104
Tom Kent blames Trudeau for not wanting to cede any control over the appointment
process. See Tom Kent, “Supreme Court Appointments: By Parliament, Not PM, and Shorter” in
Verrelli, supra, note 20, 93, at 96 [hereinafter “Kent”]: “Trudeau’s determined dedication to the
Charter was joined with scant regard for most of politics and its practitioners. Willing as he was to
upset many applecarts, the existing concentration of authority in the prime minister was to him the
natural order of things. Amid the constitution-making turmoil of 1981 there were no voices strong
enough to say him nay.”
105
See Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11, ss. 41(d), 42(d) (as discussed in Supreme Court Reference, supra, note 3).
106
Peter W. Hogg, Meech Lake Constitutional Accord Annotated (Toronto: Carswell, 1988).
107
Consensus Report on the Constitution in Kenneth McRoberts & Patrick Monahan, eds.,
The Charlottetown Accord, the Referendum and the Future of Canada (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1993).
108
Some scholars have continued to raise them. See F.C. DeCoste, “The Jurisprudence”,
supra, note 87; others supra, note 86.
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the Official Opposition party, the Reform Party with its 52 seats made a
huge impact on national politics over the course of the next decade in
many areas of public policy. In the area of fiscal policy, it helped galvanize support against budget deficits. In the area that might be considered
“democratic policy”, Preston Manning’s Reform Party promoted populist
initiatives like Senate Reform, free votes in the House of Commons,
judicial elections and referendums, all aimed at the devolution of power
from the Prime Minister. The Reform Party hammered away at the
democratic reform agenda and succeeded in placing it on the national
political agenda.
The Reform Party squarely raised Supreme Court selection as part of
its democratic reform political agenda.109 Throughout the 1990s, Reform
Party platforms consistently took aim at judicial appointments. Reform
platform “Blue Books” called generally for “more stringent and more
public ratification procedures for Supreme Court justices in light of the
powers our legislators are handing to the courts”.110 In 1991, Reform
added a call for the (reformed) Senate to ratify Supreme Court appointments.111 In 1996-1997, Reform called for a more “democratic and
accountable” system for all judicial appointments.112 Reform advocated a
role for the provinces in the appointment process113 and term limits for
Supreme Court justices.114

109
On the critical role of the Reform party in this respect, see Crandall, supra, note 87,
at 77-78. For criticisms of the Prime Minister’s power of appointment over Supreme Court justices
during this period see Jacob S. Ziegel, “Merit Selection”, supra, note 28; Peter McCormick, “Could
We, Should We, Reform the Senate and the Supreme Court?” (January-February 2000) Policy
Options 7; Ted Morton, “Reforming the Canadian Judiciary”, Remarks prepared for the Calgary
Congress, Citizens Centre for Freedom of Democracy, September 30, 2006 (on file with the author).
110
Reform Party of Canada, Principles & Policies 1990 (Calgary: Reform, 1990), at 7,
online: <http://contentdm.ucalgary.ca/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/reform&CISOPTR=2230
&REC=19>. This language is repeated verbatim in: Reform Party of Canada, Principles & Policies
The Blue Book 1995 (Calgary: Reform, 1995), at 38, online: <http://contentdm.ucalgary.ca/cdm4/
document.php?CISOROOT=/reform&CISOPTR=2156&REC=2> [hereinafter “Blue Book 1995”].
111
Reform Party of Canada, Principles & Policies 1991 (Calgary: Reform, 1991), at 7,
online: <http://contentdm.ucalgary.ca/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/reform&CISOPTR=2212
&REC=20>. See also Blue Book 1995, id., at 38.
112
Reform Party of Canada, Blue Book 1996-1997 Principles & Policies of the Reform
Party of Canada (Calgary: Reform, 1996), at 28 <http://digitalcollections.ucalgary.ca/cdm4/
document.php?CISOROOT=/reform&CISOPTR=2128&REC=7> [hereinafter “Blue Book 1996-1997”].
113
Id. This is also stated in Reform Party of Canada, Blue Book Principles & Policies of the
Reform Party of Canada 1999 (Calgary: Reform, 1999), at 13 <http://contentdm.ucalgary.ca/cdm4/
document.php?CISOROOT=/reform&CISOPTR=2258&REC=18> [hereinafter “Blue Book 1999”].
114
Blue Book 1996-1997, id., at 28; Blue Book 1999, id., at 13. The Canadian Constitutional
Foundation (“CCF”) continues to advocate for term limits for Supreme Court justices. See online:
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Democratic reform became a leading political issue in the first years
of the 21st century.115 The democratic reform movement was supported
by academic and popular writings and translated into a vast array of political party initiatives, some of which became government policy. In The
Friendly Dictatorship,116 Globe and Mail columnist Jeffrey Simpson
captured the spirit of the Chrétien age in what has become the defining
political analysis of that period. University of Moncton Professor Donald
Savoie wrote academic volumes that catalogued and critiqued the centralization of power.117
The opening years of the 21st century saw the makings of a democratic
reform movement. In 2001, Gordon Campbell’s Liberal Party swept to
power in British Columbia118 promising various democratic reforms.119
In New Brunswick, the government created a Commission on Legislative
Democracy in December 2003 to examine and make recommendations
regarding electoral, legislative and democratic reform. 120 In Prince
Edward Island, a 2003 report recommending electoral reform was
followed by another commission detailing the proposed reform and a

<http://termlimits.ca/>. For reasons that I hope to describe elsewhere at another time, this is a
solution in search of a problem.
115
I first chronicled the democratic reform movement in Adam M. Dodek, “The Past,
Present and Future of Fixed Election Dates in Canada” (2010) 4 J. of Parliamentary and Political L.
215. The following paragraphs largely reproduce material contained in pages 218-223 of that article.
116
Jeffrey Simpson, The Friendly Dictatorship (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2002).
117
See Donald J. Savoie, Court Government and the Collapse of Accountability in Canada
and the United Kingdom (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008) [hereinafter “Savoie”] and
Governing from the Centre: The Concentration of Power in Canadian Politics (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1999). For a more recent compelling account of the democratic deficit and the
need for reform, see Peter Aucoin, Mark D. Jarvis & Lori Turnbull, Democratizing the Constitution:
Reforming Responsible Government (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2011).
118
There were two important drivers for Campbell’s democratic reform agenda. First, the
B.C. Liberals had never held power in modern B.C. politics. Second, in the May 1996 election, the
B.C. Liberal Party had lost the provincial election by six seats despite winning the popular vote.
Attorney General and Minister Responsible for Constitutional Reform Geoff Plant explained the
May 1996 election as a “turning point” for democracy in British Columbia. See Geoff Plant, “The
Government’s View” in Gordon Gibson, ed., Fixing Canadian Democracy (Vancouver: The Fraser
Institute, 2003) 169, at 170.
119
These included fixed election dates, fixed dates for tabling of the budget, a set legislative
calendar, holding open cabinet meetings to be televised and broadcast over the Internet, overhauling
campaign financing laws, introducing free votes in the legislature and establishing a Citizen’s Assembly
on electoral reform to be followed by a province-wide referendum on proposed changes to the electoral
system. See B.C. Liberal Party, A New Era for British Columbia (2001) 30 (on file with author).
120
See Commission on Legislative Democracy (N.B.), Final Report and Recommendations
(Fredericton: Commission on Legislative Democracy, 2004), at 4 (“How We Did Our Work”) and 181-82
(“Background Appendix: Mission, Mandate, and Terms of Reference”).
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failed plebiscite in November 2005 rejecting reform.121 In Quebec, the
Estates General on the Reform of Democratic Institutions (the Beland
Commission) presented a report to the Minister Responsible for Reform
of Democratic Institutions in March 2003.122
In Ontario, Dalton McGuinty’s opposition Liberals made democratic
reform one of five key pillars of their 2003 platform,123 and after winning
the election that year created a Democratic Reform Secretariat and
named a Minister Responsible for Democratic Renewal.124 Ontario’s
Liberals implemented various democratic reform initiatives, most notably fixed election dates and a Citizen’s Assembly on Electoral Reform
culminating in a province-wide referendum on voting day in October
2007 under the province’s first fixed election date.
By 2003, several leading political scientists commented on the
centrality of the democratic deficit in Canadian public policy discourse:
“Few would have foreseen five years ago that the very infrastructure of
democracy would today be the most active area of public policy deliberation and innovation in this country.”125 This was the political context
surrounding Paul Martin’s embrace of the democratic reform agenda
when he began publicly challenging Jean Chrétien for the Liberal Party
leadership.126 Mr. Martin’s advocacy for changing the Supreme Court
appointment process must be viewed through this prism.

121
See Andre Barnes & James R. Robertson, Electoral Reform Initiatives in Canadian
Provinces (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, August 18, 2009), at 7-10.
122
Id.
123
Ontario Liberal Party, Government That Works for You: The Ontario Liberal Plan for a
More Democratic Ontario (Toronto: Ontario Liberal Party, 2003).
124
The author served as Senior Policy Adviser to the Hon. Michael Bryant, Attorney
General of Ontario and Minister Responsible for Aboriginal Affairs during the time that he was also
the Minister Responsible for Democratic Reform (October 2003 to June 2005). In June 2005, the
Hon. Marie Boutrogianni became the Minister Responsible for Democratic Reform and the Minister
of Intergovernmental Relations for the duration of the Ontario Liberals’ first mandate until the
first fixed-date election was held in October 2007. After that election, no Minister Responsible
for Democratic Reform was appointed and the Democratic Renewal Secretariat (“DRS”) was
organizationally abandoned. See Government of Ontario, “Browse by Organization”, online:
<http://www.infogo.gov.on.ca/infogo/searchDirectory.do?actionType=searchtelephone&infoType=
telephone&locale=en>.
125
Paul Howe, Richard Johnston & André Blais, “Introduction: The New Landscape of
Canadian Democracy” in Paul Howe, Richard Johnston & André Blais, eds., Strengthening
Canadian Democracy (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2005) 3, at 6.
126
On the centrality of democratic reform for Paul Martin’s policy agenda, see Susan
Delacourt, Juggernaut: Paul Martin’s Campaign for Chrétien’s Crown (Toronto: McClelland &
Stewart, 2003), at 258-59.
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Martin put forward a package of reforms to strengthen the role of Parliament and reduce the power of the Prime Minister’s Office (“PMO”).127
These included more free votes for MPs, increased independence for
parliamentary committees, creating an independent ethics commissioner
and improving the system for private members’ bills. Martin proposed that
Supreme Court nominations be subject to review by a parliamentary committee.128 The key event was a speech Martin gave at Osgoode Hall Law
School on October 21, 2002, in which he laid out a six-point plan for
democratic reform in order to reduce the “democratic deficit”.129 The entire
thrust of Martin’s plan was to reduce or “check” the power of the executive
and strengthen Parliament. Martin promised to change the culture of
Ottawa away from “Who do you know in the PMO?”130
On the day that Paul Martin became Prime Minister in December 2003,
he announced that his government would “change the way things work in
Ottawa in order to re-engage Canadians in the political process” and that his
government would “introduce a number of reforms to the way House of
Commons affairs are conducted in order to provide Canadians with more
responsive government”.131 The purpose of such reforms was to “restore
Canadians’ trust that their government is listening to them. This is best done
by confirming Parliament as the centre of national debate and renewing the
capacity of Parliamentarians — from all parties — to shape policy.”132 In a
separate press release on democratic reform, the Prime Minister announced

127
John Gray, Paul Martin: The Power of Ambition (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 2003), at
228; Susan Delacourt, Juggernaut: Paul Martin’s Campaign for Chrétien’s Crown (Toronto:
McClelland & Stewart, 2003), at 258-59, 297; and Brooke Jeffrey, Divided Loyalties: The Liberal
Party of Canada, 1984-2008 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), at 410-12.
128
Paul Martin, Speech at Osgoode Hall Law School (October 21, 2002) [hereinafter “Paul
Martin, Speech”]. See Campbell Clark, “Martin’s plan gives back bench more clout; His proposal to
transform Parliament would bolster MPs and cut PMO’s power” The Globe and Mail (October 22,
2002), A1 [hereinafter “Clark”].
129
While Martin used the term “democratic deficit” in 2002 to describe the weakened role of
Parliament and parliamentarians in Canadian politics, two years earlier three scholars at Dalhousie
Law School (now Schulich School of Law at Dalhousie University) described the judicial
appointment process as a “democratic deficit”. See Devlin, Mackay & Kim, supra, note 85. The
authors also credit Dr. Alexandra Dobrowolsky of St. Mary’s University for suggesting the title to
them. For Mr. Martin’s reflections on his changes to the process, see Paul Martin, Hell or High
Water: My Life In and Out of Politics (Toronto: Douglas Gibson, 2008), at 406-407.
130
Paul Martin, Speech, supra, note 128. See Clark, supra, note 128.
131
Prime Minister’s Office, Press Release, “A New Approach: Prime Minister Martin
Announces New Government will be guided by a new approach” (December 12, 2003), online:
<http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/205/301/prime_minister-ef/paul_martin/06-02-03/www.pm.gc.ca/eng/
news.asp@id=3>.
132
Id.
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that his government would “specifically consult the Standing Committee on
Justice and Human Rights on how best to implement prior review of appointments of Supreme Court of Canada judges”.133 Minister of Justice
Irwin Cotler has written that the Prime Minister spoke to him that same day,
emphasizing the importance of reforming the Supreme Court appointments
process and of Parliament’s role in that reform.134
In February 2004, the Martin Government issued a “Democratic
Action Plan” that was entitled Ethics, Responsibility, Accountability: An
Action Plan for Democratic Reform.135 It built on Martin’s December
2003 announcements and made them official government policy. The
Democratic Action Plan called for prior parliamentary committee review
of all high-level appointments made by the federal government. On
Supreme Court appointments, the Democratic Action Plan was less than
concrete. It committed the government to consult the relevant parliamentary committee(s) on how best to implement review of Supreme Court
appointments. Importantly, Martin’s Democratic Action Plan identified
three pillars: (1) “Ethics and integrity”; (2) “Restoration of the representative and deliberative role of MPs”; and (3) “Accountability”.136
As discussed in Part II, in March 2004 the Justice Committee began
considering reforms to the Supreme Court appointments process. Considerations were interrupted by the federal election, which was held on
June 28, 2004 and returned a Liberal minority government. The Liberal
Party had included its commitment to give Parliament a role in reviewing
Supreme Court appointments in its spring election platform. 137 Again,
this was made in the context of “tackling the democratic deficit”.138 In
133
Prime Minister’s Office, Press Release, “Democratic Reform” (December 12, 2003),
online: <http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/205/301/prime_minister-ef/paul_martin/06-02-03/www.pm.gc.
ca/eng/news.asp@id=1>.
134
Cotler, “The Supreme Court Appointment Process” supra, note 2, at 134.
135
Privy Council Office, Ethics, Responsibility, Accountability: An Action Plan for
Democratic Reform (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, February 4 2004), online: <http://www.pcobcp.gc.ca/docs/information/publications/aarchives/dr-rd/docs/dr-rd-eng.pdf>. Paul Martin’s Osgoode
speech references Parliament committee review of all government appointments generally, but does
not mention the Supreme Court specifically. Paul Martin, “Democratic Deficit” (2002/2003) 24:1
Policy Options 10 [text of speech].
136
Privy Council Office, id.
137
See Liberal Party of Canada, Moving Canada Forward: The Paul Martin Plan for
Getting Things Done (Ottawa: Liberal Party of Canada, 2004), at 7.
138
Id.
Paul Martin took office with a detailed plan to make government work better for Canadians
— to make it more democratic, more ethical, more accountable. The new government has:
• Restored Parliament to the centre of national debate and decision-making by
implementing broad democratic reforms to give your MP a greater voice.
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August 2004, Prime Minister Martin selected Justices Abella and
Charron to fill the vacancies created by the departures of Justices Arbour
and Iacobucci. Minister of Justice Irwin Cotler appeared before an ad hoc
committee of parliamentarians instead of the Justice Committee because
the new post-election Parliament had not yet been summoned.
In November 2005, the Martin government fell and Stephen Harper
became Prime Minister after the January 2006 election. A central issue in
the campaign was the Gomery Commission and ethical government.
Prime Minister Harper and his Conservative Party were elected in
January 2006 with the campaign slogan “Demand Better” and promised
sweeping democratic reforms. Accountability and transparency were
central themes in the Speech from the Throne in 2006 and in the Prime
Minister’s response to it.139 One of the new Government’s first orders of
business was to enact the Accountability Act.140
As described earlier, the Harper government literally picked up from
where the Martin government had left off, appointing Marshall Rothstein
from the shortlist submitted to Liberal Minister of Justice Irwin Cotler. The
Harper government explicitly added the parliamentary hearing as a “Process
designed to increase openness and accountability”.141 Importantly, the announcement by the Prime Minister added an additional justification for the
parliamentary hearings, stating that “The Supreme Court is a vital institution
that belongs to all Canadians ... the public deserves to know more about the
individuals appointed to serve there, and the method by which they are
appointed. ...”142 These three themes: (1) openness or transparency;
– Most votes in the House of Commons are now free votes, in which MPs can
represent the views of their constituents as they see fit. Since Paul Martin became
Prime Minister, 72% of House votes have been free votes.
– Parliamentarians now have the authority to review most senior government
appointments, including those of heads of Crown Corporations.
– The government has committed that Parliament will play a role in reviewing
Supreme Court appointments.
139
See Canada, Speech from the Throne to Open the First Session of the 39th Parliament of
Canada, online: <http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/index.asp?lang=eng&page=information&sub=publications&
doc=aarchives/sft-ddt/2006-eng.htm>; and Prime Minister of Canada, “Turning a New Leaf: Notes
for an Address by the Right Honourable Stephen Harper, Prime Minister of Canada, In Support of
Measures Contained in The Speech from the Throne” (April 5, 2006), online: <http://pm.gc.ca/
eng/news/2006/04/05/prime-minister-backs-speech-throne>.
140
Bill C-2, An Act providing for conflict of interest rules, restrictions on election financing
and measures respecting administrative transparency, oversight and accountability, S.C. 2006, c. 9.
141
Prime Minister of Canada, “News Release: Supreme Court Nominee to Face Questions
from Parliamentarians” (February 20, 2006), online: <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2006/02/20/supremecourt-nominee-face-questions-parliamentarians>.
142
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(2) accountability; and (3) learning about the individuals appointed to serve
on the Supreme Court were repeated by Minister of Justice Toews at the parliamentary hearing for Justice Rothstein and in the announcements,
appointments and parliamentary hearings in 2011, 2012 and 2013.143
4. Public Perception of the Supreme Court of Canada
In the epigraph at the beginning of this paper, Irwin Cotler linked
concerns about the integrity and fairness of the appointment process to
the independence of the judiciary. While this linkage is correct as a matter of theory and at times and places as a matter of fact as well, it is
important to acknowledge that public dissatisfaction with the Supreme
Court of Canada was not a driver of reforms to the appointments process
over the past decade.144
Academics who studied media coverage of the Supreme Court between
2000 and 2001 opined that “the Supreme Court has dominated the Canadian
political landscape in terms of its credibility and prestige”.145 While this has
not been the case throughout the Supreme Court’s history, it does accurately
describe the place of the Supreme Court over the last 30 years. Public opinion polls in the 1980s and 1990s consistently showed high levels of support
for the Supreme Court as an institution,146 especially compared to other
143

See supra, notes 58, 61 and 62. The anomalous appointment process of Justice Cromwell.
in 2008 is discussed in Part II, supra.
144
Professor Cotler identified six factors as providing the impetus for reform: (1) the impact of the
Charter as transforming the legal and political landscape in Canada; (2) the centrality of the Supreme Court
of Canada in this “constitutional revolution”, which elevated the profile of “unelected, unrepresentative,
and unaccountable judges” allegedly usurping the democratic decision-making process; (3) “the perception
of an ‘activist Court’ propagating ‘liberal values’”; (4) “the dynamic of judicial decision-making intruding
upon, if not overtaking policy decisions that ought to be made by Parliament;” (5) fallout from the Gomery
Commission that was extended to the judicial appointments process because it implicated Liberalappointed Federal Court judges; and (6) “the perceived anomaly of the executive — effectively the Prime
Minister — making appointments to the Supreme Court alone, without any Parliamentary input or
accountability”. Cotler, “The Supreme Court Appointment Process”, supra, note 2, at 133. This
explanation provides the immediate context for the reforms in 2004-2006.
145
Florian Sauvageau, David Schneiderman & David Taras, The Last Word: Media
Coverage of the Supreme Court of Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006), at 26 [hereinafter
“Sauvageau, Schneiderman & Taras”].
146
A Focus Canada survey of the justice system in 1989 found a high level of support for the
Supreme Court. Seventy-six per cent of respondents indicated “a lot” or “some” confidence in the
Supreme Court. Shirley Ouellet, Public Attitudes towards the Legitimacy of Our Institutions and the
Administration of Justice (Ottawa: Department of Justice, Canada, Research and Development
Directorate, 1991) [hereinafter “Ouellet”]; Supreme Court of Canada Microlog no. 96-00418; the
same level of support is reported in Julian Roberts, Public Confidence in Criminal Justice: A Review
of Recent Trends, 2004-05: A Report for Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada
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branches of government.147 A 1989 poll found that a majority of Canadians
had confidence in the Supreme Court to make appropriate Charter decisions.148 A 1999 survey specifically investigating support of the Supreme
Court revealed that of those respondents who were aware of the Supreme
Court,149 76.6 per cent expressed support for the high court.150
Sauvageau, Schneiderman and Taras report that a 2001 Gallup poll indicated that the Supreme Court enjoyed the greatest respect from Canadians
compared to almost all other Canadian institutions, including federal and
provincial governments and the House of Commons.151 Supreme Court
commentators noted the high levels of public support when proposing
changes to the appointment process. In a 2000 symposium on judicial appointments, Professor F.C. DeCoste stated that “[s]o far as the citizenry is
concerned, our judges appear to be enjoying substantial popular support.”152
Even attacks on the Supreme Court for “judicial activism” did not
have a significant impact on public support for the Supreme Court as an
institution.153 While support for the outcomes in specific cases has been
found to be somewhat linked to approval of the Supreme Court as an institution, it does not have significant impact on that widespread

(Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, 2004), at 13, online: <http://www.publicsafety.
gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/pblc-cnfdnc-crmnl/index-eng.aspx>.
147
A different Focus Canada Poll in 1988 found that 59 per cent of respondents were “very”
or “somewhat” satisfied with the federal government. Ouellett, id., at 5.
148
Id., at 11. Ouellet does not report the exact number.
149
A total of 76.3 per cent of respondents were “somewhat” or “very” aware of the Supreme
Court of Canada. See Joseph Fletcher & Paul Howe, “Public Opinion and the Courts” in Paul Howe
& Peter H. Russell, eds., Judicial Power and Canadian Democracy (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 2005) 255, at 265 [hereinafter “Fletcher & Howe”]. The data cited in this
paragraph are from a 1999 Institute for Research on Public Policy poll which Fletcher and Howe
designed in 1999. Elsewhere in the article they also use data from an unnamed 1987 “academic
survey”.
150
Fletcher & Howe, id. When differentiated by region, Quebec scored the lowest on both of
these points: only 42 per cent awareness and 69.8 per cent satisfaction. Fletcher & Howe, id., at 265.
The data cited in this paragraph are from a 1999 Institute for Research on Public Policy poll which
Fletcher and Howe designed in 1999. Elsewhere in the article they also use data from an unnamed
1987 “academic survey”.
151
Sauvageau, Schneiderman & Taras, supra, note 145, at 26-27, citing Josephine Mazzuca,
“Armed forces, Supreme Court and public schools top institutional list for respect and confidence”
(May 28, 2001) 61Gallup Poll 30.
152
F.C. DeCoste, “Introduction” (2000) 38 Alta. L. Rev. 60, at 608. He cited polls from
1999 that showed that 62 per cent of Canadians supported judicial over parliamentary supremacy
and that 77 per cent of Canadians were favourably disposed to the Supreme Court of Canada. Janice
Tibbetts, “Judges should have final say, poll suggests” The Edmonton Journal (April 14, 1999) A3
[hereinafter “Tibbetts, ‘Judges should have final say’”], cited in F.C. DeCoste, id., at 608.
153
Fletcher & Howe, supra, note 149.
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support.154 Similarly, while political views influence opinions about specific Supreme Court decisions and may indirectly reduce support for the
Supreme Court,155 a high level of support for the Court persists, even
among people who disagree with the outcome of high-profile cases.156
Public support for the Supreme Court remained high into the 2000s.
Ipsos-Reid data from the early years of the decade found that 70 per cent
of respondents approved of the Supreme Court’s actions “over the past
year or so”.157 Interestingly, despite this strong approval, the same poll
found that only 10 per cent of Canadians believed that the Supreme
Court was completely free of any political influence, while 84 per cent
thought the Court’s decisions were influenced by partisan politics “to
some degree”.158 A 2010 Environics poll also found high support for the
Supreme Court. The poll found that the Supreme Court (together with the
military and the justice system) enjoyed ongoing, relatively high levels
of confidence. The Supreme Court had a 69 per cent confidence level,
down three per cent from the Environics 2007 poll. In contrast, Parliament and political parties enjoyed lower levels of confidence and
were declining faster: Parliament enjoyed 42 per cent confidence, down

154
Lori Hausegger & Troy Riddell, “The Changing Nature of Public Support for the
Supreme Court of Canada” (2004) 37:1 Can. J. Poli. Sci. 23, at 24-25. Their exact phrasing in their
conclusion is that they found “some support” for this hypothesis. Fletcher & Howe, id., at 281.
155
Fletcher & Howe, id., at 229.
156
Fletcher & Howe, id. Among people who disagreed with the outcome of all three cases
(a total 10 per cent of respondents), 58 per cent of them agreed that the Supreme Court, not
Parliament, should have the last word on constitutional review. Id., at 284.
157
Darrell Bricker & John Wright, What Canadians Think About Almost Everything
(Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 2005), at 14. The book does not mention the exact year the data was
recorded, only that this time period “includes the controversial Robert Latimer appeal”, and
therefore it must be 2002, or possibly 2001 as Latimer was decided by the Supreme Court in 2001.
See R. v. Latimer, [2001] S.C.J. No. 1, 2001 SCC 1, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). Thanks to Emily
Alderson for this deduction and for her excellent research in this section generally. Contrary to
Fletcher and Howe’s findings, support for the Supreme Court’s actions was highest in Quebec
(77 per cent). Paradoxically, Quebec is also ranked the province the “most likely to oppose an SCC
decision”. Id., at 15. Support for the Supreme Court’s actions was lowest in Saskatchewan and
Manitoba (62 per cent), although this may be due to the recently concluded case of Robert Latimer, a
Saskatchewan resident. Fully 59 per cent of Canadians disagreed with the Supreme Court’s decision
to uphold his sentence. Although Bricker and Wright do not hypothesize on reasons for Supreme
Court support, this may be another instance where specific support has some mild impact on diffuse
support. Bricker and Wright break down Supreme Court approval by demographics: approval
increases with education (78 per cent among university graduates and 59 per cent among those with
a high school education), and with income (74 per cent among those earning above $30,000 annually
and 65 per cent among those earning less). Id., at 15.
158
Id.
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13 per cent from 2007, and political parties were once again the least confidence-inspiring at 19 per cent, down 13 per cent.159
Conversely, polls show a high level of dissatisfaction with the appointment process for Supreme Court judges and even a desire for judges
to be elected.160 Thus, public opinion polls reveal what might be considered a paradox: a high level of public support for the Supreme Court but
a desire for change in the appointment process.161 This may represent
inconsistent public opinion, which is not unusual, or it might reflect public sophistication in terms of dissatisfaction with the process of
appointment rather than with the results.
Reforms to the appointments process were not a response to any perception that the persons appointed had been problematic in some way. 162
Reflecting on his experience as Minister of Justice, Irwin Cotler wrote
that the Supreme Court of Canada “is respected across the country and
around the world as a model of what a vital, modern, and independent
judicial institution should be”.163 According to the Minister of Justice
who began the reform process, the existing process had produced excellent appointees.164 While it is easy to dismiss such statements as political
rhetoric, the thrust of the political discourse over the past 25 years has
been about empowering Parliament and reining in the Prime Minister,
not changing the Supreme Court.
Thus, when Minister Cotler appeared at the Ad Hoc Committee on
Supreme Court of Canada Appointments in August 2004 after the
appointment of Justices Abella and Charron, he commented that the appointments process “has been critiqued not with regard to the quality of
appointments, but with respect to the lack of transparency and Parliamentary input. And, yes, there has been a lack of transparency, an
absence of Parliamentary input, and very little by way of public

159
Environics, Focus Canada (2010), at 19, online: <http://www.queensu.ca/cora/_files/fc2010
report.pdf>.
160
Sauvageau, Schneiderman & Taras, supra, note 145, citing Chris Cobb, “Canadians want
to elect court” National Post (February 4, 2002) A1.
161
See Tibbetts, “Judges should have final say”, supra, note 152 (noting that only 8 per cent
of Canadians support the way in which judges are appointed).
162
See Alarie & Green, “Policy Preference”, supra, note 43, at para. 2: “the evidence shows
that the judicial appointments process to the Supreme Court has been satisfactory”; Rory Leishman,
“No Need for Radical Reform of the Federal Judicial Appointment Process” (2007) 58 U.N.B.L.J.
112, at 120; Cotler, “The Supreme Court Appointment Process”, supra, note 2.
163
Cotler, “The Supreme Court Appointment Process”, id., at 132.
164
Id.
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involvement.” According to then-Minister Cotler, that is what his
government was “seeking to reform and rectify”.165

IV. AUDIT
This section analyzes the reforms between 2004 and 2013 in terms of
(1) transparency; (2) accountability; and (3) the promotion of public
knowledge about the work of the Supreme Court of Canada and its judges. The first two factors are linked because transparency is not an end in
itself; it is a necessary pre-condition for ensuring accountability.166
Transparency relates to the openness of the process whereas accountability involves explanation for actions or decisions.
Accountability is an important feature of responsible government under the Canadian Constitution.167 Individual ministers “are accountable to
Parliament for the exercise of the powers, duties and functions vested in
them by statute or otherwise”.168 Under our parliamentary system of government, accountability “derives directly from the responsibility of
ministers”.169 The Ministry is collectively accountable for all the policies
and actions of the government; ministers “must be prepared to explain and
defend the Government’s policies before Parliament at all times”.170 This is
accountability in the constitutional sense, but accountability may be
understood in a broader sense as “a means of making responsible the exercise of power”.171 In her testimony before the Gomery Commission,
165
Department of Justice, Speeches, Speaking Notes for Irwin Cotler, Minister of Justice
and Attorney General of Canada on the Occasion of a Presentation to the Ad Hoc Committee on
Supreme Court Appointments” (August 25, 2004), online: <http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/
webarchives/20071116083626/http://www.canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/sp/2004/doc_31212.html>
[hereinafter “Speaking Notes”].
166
For example, Dean Sossin has asserted that “[a]n accountability culture suggests a focus
both on transparent criteria for selection and justification to ensure that the criteria were
appropriately applied.” Sossin, “Judicial Appointment”, supra, note 81, at 39.
167
See Canada, Privy Council Office, Responsibility in the Constitution, “Constitutional
Responsibility and Accountability”, online: <http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/index.asp?lang=eng&page=
information&sub=publications&doc=constitution/table-eng.htm> Part VII [hereinafter “Responsibility in
the Constitution”].
168
Canada, Privy Council Office, Accountable Government: A Guide for Ministers and
Ministers of State (2011), at 2 [hereinafter “Accountable Government”].
169
Responsibility in the Constitution, supra, note 167, “The Principles of Accountability”, at
Part VIII.
170
Accountable Government, supra, note 168, at iv.
171
Responsibility in the Constitution, supra, note 167, at Part VIII. On accountability
generally, see Mark Bovens, Robert E. Goodin & Thomas Schillemans, eds., The Oxford Handbook
of Public Accountability (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
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Jocelyn Bourgon, Canada’s former top civil servant, explained that “where
authority resides, so resides accountability, and if one has authority to
strike a decision, then one has an obligation to provide an account”.172
Transparency is but one means of making responsible the exercise of
power. Thus, in auditing accountability, we will seek to evaluate the extent
to which the process makes those responsible for the exercise of power
through the appointment process explain or account for such decisions.
1. Transparency
In terms of transparency, we seek to evaluate the availability of information about the operation of the appointment process. We seek to
understand factors including the following: (1) how the process works;
(2) the criteria for selection; (3) who is consulted; (4) the role of the public; (5) how the Minister of Justice prepares the so-called “long list”, and
how many names are on it; (6) what the Selection Panel does; and
(7) who makes the ultimate decision. When these questions are considered, the inevitable conclusion is that we know much less about the
process in 2014 than we did a decade ago when Justices Abella and
Charron were appointed to the Court. The continuing controversy
surrounding the appointment of Justice Nadon in 2013-2014 has demonstrated just how opaque the appointment process has become.
(a) How Does the Process Work?
Since the reforms were initiated in 2004, no government has published comprehensive guidelines on how the selection process works.
Since the Rothstein appointment, the transparency of the appointment
process has been significantly reduced. The only information known
about the process is what the Prime Minister has announced in successive
press releases:
•

To identify a pool of qualified candidates for appointment to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Minister of Justice and Attorney General
will consult with the Ontario Attorney General, as well as leading
members of the legal community. Members of the public are invited

172
Canada, Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities
(The Hon. John Gomery, Commissioner) (Ottawa), vol. 47, December 8, 2004, at 8235, quoted in
Savoie, supra, note 117, at 257.
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to submit their input with respect to qualified candidates who merit
consideration at www.justice.gc.ca/eng/scc-csc.html.
•

The list of qualified candidates will be reviewed by a selection panel
composed of five Members of Parliament — including three Members from the Government Caucus and one Member from each of the
recognized Opposition Caucuses, as selected by their respective
leaders — to review the list of qualified candidates.

•

The Supreme Court Selection Panel will be responsible to assess the
candidates and provide an unranked short list of six qualified candidates to the Prime Minister of Canada and the Minister of Justice for
their consideration.

•

The two selected nominees will appear at a public hearing of an ad
hoc parliamentary committee to answer questions of Members of
Parliament. This is a process that was first established for the
appointment of the Honourable Mr. Justice Marshall E. Rothstein
in 2006.173

This limited information about the operation of the process is deficient,
as will become apparent in the successive sections.
(b) What Are the Criteria for Selection?
There has been a decrease in transparency in terms of publication of
the criteria for selection since the reforms began in 2004. Under the tenure of Minister of Justice Cotler, such criteria were clearly articulated as:
professional capacity;174 personal characteristics;175 and diversity on the

173
Prime Minister of Canada, “Upcoming Retirement”, supra, note 58. See also Prime
Minister of Canada, “Marie Deschamps”, supra, note 61; and Prime Minister of Canada, “Justice
Morris Fish”, supra, note 62.
174
Professional capacity included: (1) “the highest level of proficiency in the law, superior
intellectual ability and analytical and written skills;” (2) “proven ability to listen and to maintain an
open mind while hearing all sides of an argument;” (3) “decisiveness and soundness of judgement;”
(4) “capacity to manage and share consistently heavy workload in a collaborative context;”
(5) “capacity to manage stress and the pressures of the isolation of the judicial role;” (6) “strong
cooperative interpersonal skills;” (7) “awareness of social context;” (8) “bilingual capacity;” and
(9) “specific expertise required for the Supreme Court.” Speaking Notes, supra, note 165.
175
Personal characteristics included: (1) highest level of personal and professional ethics:
“honesty; integrity; candour;” (2) “respect and consideration for others: patience; courtesy; tact;
humility; fairness; tolerance;” and (3) “personal sense of responsibility: common sense; punctuality;
reliability.” Id.
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Court.176 Since 2006, the criteria for evaluating candidates for appointment
are no longer published by the government.
In each of the appointments in each of 2006, 2011, 2012 and 2013,
Peter Hogg or Jean-Louis Baudouin identified qualities that they
believed Supreme Court justices should have.177 The list of qualities
differed as between Professors Hogg and Baudouin, which is problematic
in and of itself. Moreover, there is no indication that the qualities
identified by Professors Hogg and Baudouin were used by the Minister
of Justice in creating the long list, by the Selection Panel in creating the
short list of candidates, or by the Minister of Justice and the Prime
Minister in selecting the nominee. Additionally, the articulation of the
qualifications shows the important link between transparency and
accountability. If the parliamentary hearings are supposed to serve an
accountability function, it becomes difficult for MPs to fulfil this
function if the criteria for selecting candidates — which should then
become the criteria for evaluating the nominee — are unknown or
articulated only at the beginning of the parliamentary hearing.
(c) Who Is Consulted and What Is the Nature of those Consultations?
We do now know the people who are consulted for their opinions
about potential candidates for appointment. In 2004, Minister of Justice
Cotler explained that he consulted with the following individuals:


the Chief Justice of Canada, Beverley McLachlin;



the Attorney General of Ontario, Michael Bryant;



the Chief Justice of Ontario, Roy McMurtry;



the Treasurer of the Law Society of Upper Canada, Frank Marrocco;



the President of the Canadian Bar Association, William Johnson; and



the President of the Ontario Bar Association, Jonathan Spiegel.178

176

Id. As discussed in Part III, there is no indication that the criteria were actually used by
Minister Cotler or by subsequent selection panels.
177
See Rothstein Transcript (2006) [hereinafter “Rothstein Transcript”]; Moldaver &
Karakatsanis Transcript; Wagner Transcript; and Nadon Transcript, supra, note 84. See also Hogg,
“Appointment of Justice Marshall Rothstein”, supra, note 49, at 538.
178
Speaking Notes, supra, note 165. In his appearance before the Justice Committee in
March 2004, Cotler explained that he would consult with the following individuals:
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Similar explanations have been provided by successive Ministers of
Justice in each of the appointments since 2004.179
To say that certain people were consulted in making a decision does
not reveal the quality of those consultations.180 Tom Kent has asked:
“How wide are the consultations that precede the decision, what considerations are weighed, what alternatives considered …?”181 In the absence
of published criteria for appointment and consultation guidelines,182 we
do not know the answers.
There are consultations and then there are consultations. A consultation may be a pro forma affair wherein the person being consulted is
asked for suggestions which are then politely filed away. Such appears to
have been the case with the federal government’s consultation with the
Attorney General of Quebec over the Nadon appointment.183 Consultations may also be a true dialogue: a discussion and an exchange of ideas.
Such was clearly the case in the summer of 2004 in the case of discussions between Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada Irwin
Cotler and the Ontario Attorney General over the two pending appointments
to the Supreme Court from Ontario.184







the Chief Justice of Canada and perhaps other members of the Supreme Court of Canada;
the Chief Justices of the courts of the relevant region;
the Attorneys General of the relevant region;
at least one senior member of the Canadian Bar Association;
at least one senior member of the Law Society of the relevant region.
179
See Rothstein Transcript, supra, note 177; Karakatsanis & Moldaver Transcript; Wagner
Transcript; and Nadon Transcript, supra, note 84.
180
For an especially biting commentary on the nature of consultations, see the commentary
by University of Toronto law professor Douglas Sanderson, “Welcome to My World – Consultation
and Canada Post”, Ultra Vires (January 29, 2014), online: <http://ultravires.ca/2014/01/welcome-tomy-world-consultation-and-canada-post/>.
181
Kent, supra, note 104, at 96.
182
See, e.g., Ontario, Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs, Draft Guidelines for Ministries on
Consultation with Aboriginal Peoples Related to Aboriginal Rights and Treaty Rights (June 2006),
online: <http://docs.files.ontario.ca/documents/258/3-maa-draft-guidelines-for-ministries-on.pdf>.
183
See Paul Journet, “Le Québec lésé par le retrait du juge Nadon, dénonce Cloutier” La Presse
(October 9, 2013), quoted in Irwin Cotler, P.C., M.P. & Charlie Feldman, “Supreme Court Appointments:
When and How Should Parliament Exercise Oversight?” (March 2014) 8 J.P.P.L. 253, at 277.
184
As Carissima Mathen notes, in his appearance before the ad hoc committee in August
2004, Minister Cotler noted that he spoke to some people, including Ontario Attorney General
Michael Bryant, several times about various candidates. See Mathen, “Choices and Controversy”,
supra, note 14, at 57, note 26. In 2004, I was serving as Senior Policy Adviser to the Attorney
General of Ontario Michael Bryant, and although I did not participate in any discussions between the
two Attorneys General, I can certainly attest that such discussions took place, on more than one
occasion, and from my perspective they appeared to be real, substantive discussions of the merits of
various candidates for the country’s highest court.
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On the nature or the quality of the consultations, we also know less
in 2014 than we did in 2004. In 2004, Minister of Justice Irwin Cotler
explained the consultations that he had undertaken thusly:
In order to assess the candidates, I met with each of the people I
mentioned earlier. Indeed, I consulted them several times so as to verify
information which I had received and to assess whether a point of view
expressed by one person was shared by the others. Potential candidates
may have been identified later on in the process, at which point I would
again go back and seek the views of people I had previously spoken to.
I point this out to suggest that the consultations were not a one-shot
exchange where I spoke to each person once and that’s it. Rather, there
was an ongoing and overlapping dialogue between me and the other
consultees.
In assessing the candidates, I asked questions that were related to the
criteria mentioned earlier.
Again, I cannot stress enough that the main focus was merit. Although
my discussions were confidential, I can tell you that some of the
consultees were particularly well-placed to provide certain types of
input — for example, the Chief Justice of Canada on the expertise
required for the Court; the Chief Justice of Ontario on issues such as
collegiality and ability to handle a heavy workload; and the Attorney
General of Ontario; the Law Society; and the CBA on the candidate’s
185
reputation in the legal community.

Minister Cotler explained that he had personally read the opinions and
writings of the candidates.186
(d) What Role Does the Public Play?
Several Ministers of Justice writing after the fact have claimed that
members of the public were always free to provide their views of prospective candidates to the Minister.187 In 2005, when Justice Major announced
his retirement from the bench, Minister of Justice Irwin Cotler invited public

185

Speeches, Speaking Notes, supra, note 165.
Id. This is perhaps not surprising given that Minister Cotler was a law professor with a
reputation for reading broadly.
187
See The Honourable Anne A. McLellan, P.C., “The ‘New’ Selection Process”, 31:3
Law Matters (June 2006) 4; and Cotler, “The Supreme Court Appointment Process”, supra, note 2,
at 137.
186
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input188 and also took the unprecedented step of running advertisements in
daily newspapers in the Western provinces (Manitoba, Saskatchewan and
Alberta) from where Justice Major’s replacement was likely to come.189 The
advertisements invited written representations from “any person or group, to
propose candidates for appointment to the Supreme Court”.190 It is not
known whether the Minister received any submissions from members of the
public or what the contents of any such submissions were.
Beginning with the 2011 vacancies, the Minister of Justice explicitly
sought public input in the process. When Justices Binnie and Charron
announced their retirement in May 2011, the Prime Minister issued a
statement setting out the process which included the following element:
To identify a pool of qualified candidates for appointment to the
Supreme Court of Canada, the Minister of Justice and Attorney General
will consult with the Ontario Attorney General, as well as leading
members of the legal community. Members of the public are invited to
submit their input with respect to qualified candidates who merit
191
consideration at www.justice.gc.ca/eng/scc-csc.html.

When Justices Karakatsanis and Moldaver appeared before the
committee of parliamentarians in October 2011, the Minister of Justice
asserted that “Members of the public were also included in this process
and were provided the opportunity to submit input with respect to qualified
candidates who would merit consideration.”192
I remain deeply skeptical about the public input element for several
reasons. First, the public outreach is limited and generally passive; it is
very Web 1.0. Members of the public are invited to e-mail their views to a
Justice Canada e-mail account. There is no outreach or public consultation
with members of the public who might be knowledgeable about prospective candidates: lawyers and lawyers’ organizations.193 Second, members
of the public are generally not familiar with Supreme Court nominees and
188
Canada, Department of Justice, News Release, “Justice Minister Invites Public Input Concerning Supreme Court of Canada Vacancy” (August 30, 2005), online: <http://www.collectionscanada.
gc.ca/webarchives/20071116084213/http://www.canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/nr/2005/doc_31614.html>.
189
See, e.g., Winnipeg Free Press (August 31, 2005) A6.
190
Id.
191
Prime Minister of Canada, “Upcoming Retirement”, supra, note 58.
192
Nadon Transcript, supra, note 84. Almost identical language was used by Minister of Justice
Nicholson at Justice Wagner’s hearing in 2012 and at Justice Moldaver’s and Justice Karakatsanis’ hearing
in 2011. See Wagner Transcript, supra, note 84; Moldaver and Karakatsanis Transcript, id.
193
Ministers of justice have claimed that they have consulted with heads of selected legal
organizations, but this cannot be considered broad-based consultation with members of the legal
community, let alone “public consultation”.
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the Minister of Justice is unlikely to get much substantive input that would
actually be useful.194 Third, it is not clear that the Minister of Justice does
anything with the public input, let alone passes it along for consideration to
the Supreme Court Selection Panel for its consideration or to the parliamentary committee. There is no public summary provided of the public
input. It thus appears to me that the sole reason for the invitation to members of the public is to enable the Minister of Justice to claim that members
of the public participated in the process.
(e) How Does the Minister of Justice Prepare the So-Called “Long List”
and How Many Names Are on the “Long List”?
The amount of disclosure of the process has differed across time.
The most disclosure occurred with the appointment of Justice Rothstein
and it has decreased over time.
Thus, at the beginning of the process that led to the appointment of
Justice Rothstein, Minister of Justice Cotler stated that he would submit a

194

To test my assumption, I made an access request for 2011 requesting the following:
1. Number of e-mails received by Department of Justice in connection with May 13, 2011
announcement from the Prime Minister soliciting input into nomination process for
Supreme Court of Canada judges to send e-mails to SCC_Selection_Process@justice.gc.ca; 2.
Copies of contents of all e-mails received by [this e-mail address] between May 13, 2011 and
September 30, 2011; and 3. Copies of all memoranda, analysis, documents, etc. in connection
with any public input into the Supreme Court of Canada appointment process May 1st to
September 30, 2011.
I received 81 pages of correspondence in response to my request. No records were withheld
(names were blocked out under s. 19(1) of the Access to Information Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-1 (personal
information)). There were no memoranda, analysis or briefing notes in connection with the
correspondence, which leads me to believe that nothing was done with it. There was no indication that
the public input was fed into the decision-making process in any way. Of the 81 pages, most of letters or
e-mails consisted of members of the public generally dissatisfied with the legal system in some way.
These 81 pages included routing slips, draft responses and responses from the Minister of Justice. All
told, there were only 18 public responses. Only several are notable. The batônnier of the Barreau du
Québec wrote to the Prime Minister on June 21, 2011 advocating the importance of candidates’ ability
to hear cases in both official languages without the aide of an interpreter: Letter from the Barreau du
Québec to Prime Minister Stephen Harper, dated June 21, 2011 (on file with author). One e-mailer
stated that “…the Chief and Rosalie [Abella] must go. Send them on international mission to spread
democracy in third world country.” E-mail to the Hon. Rob Nicholson, dated June 22, 2011 (on file
with author). Only one member of the public actually recommended candidates from Ontario (one other
recommended a judge from New Brunswick). A thoughtful lawyer who claimed to be “a current
practitioner in, and follower, of the [Supreme] Court” recommended two members of the Ontario Court
of Appeal and gave a paragraph explanation for each judge as to why they would be good Supreme
Court judges. See E-mail to the Honourable Robert Nicholson, Minister of Justice and Attorney General
of Canada, dated May 17, 2011 (on file with author).
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list of five to eight names to the Advisory Committee.195 At Justice
Rothstein’s hearing, Minister of Justice Toews explained that his predecessor Irwin Cotler had submitted a list of six candidates to the advisory
committee to produce an unranked shortlist of three.196 In none of the
subsequent appointments has the Minister of Justice disclosed how many
names he provided to the Supreme Court Selection Panel.
(f) What Does the Selection Panel Do and How Does it Work?
Some information about the work of the Supreme Court Selection
Panel is available through the Office of the Commissioner for Federal
Judicial Affairs (“FJA”) which supports the work of the Selection Panel.
Thus, the FJA website explains that in July 2013, the Selection Panel
“was provided with examples of decisions written by each of the candidates put forward to replace the Honourable Morris J. Fish at the
Supreme Court of Canada”.197 The FJA further explains:
Each candidate was asked to identify 5 decisions for particular
consideration by the Panel, preferably dealing with issues coming
within the usual scope of the Supreme Court of Canada. These
decisions were to address issues requiring a consideration of principles
and policy in novel contexts rather than decisions where the dispute is
primarily factual. As far as possible, the choice of the 5 decisions was
to reflect at least one of each of the following areas of law:
Constitutional law (Charter or Federalism); Criminal law (or national
198
security); Civil law; Administrative law; and the Candidate’s choice.

The website then provided the names, citations and links to the five decisions that Justice Nadon had provided to the Selection Panel.199 Similar
information was available for the appointments in 2011 and 2012.

See Cotler, “The Supreme Court Appointment Process”, supra, note 2, at 144-45.
Rothstein Transcript, supra, note 177.
197
Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs, Supreme Court Nomination,
Examples of Decisions, Note [hereinafter “Examples of Decisions”] (available on request from the Office
of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs and on file with author). In a 2014 article, former Minister
of Justice Irwin Cotler provides the table of contents for a “binder” that MPs on the Nadon Supreme Court
Selection Panel reportedly received. See Cotler & Feldman, supra, note 36, at 275.
198
Examples of Decisions, id.
199
Id. Those decisions were Martin v. Canada (Attorney General), [2013] F.C.J. No. 51,
2013 FCA 15 (F.C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2013] S.C.C.A. No. 122 (S.C.C.); Siemens Canada
Ltd. v. J.D. Irving Ltd., [2012] F.C.J. No. 1120, 2012 FCA 225 (F.C.A.); Canada (Attorney General)
v. Jodhan, [2012] F.C.J. No. 614, 2012 FCA 161 (F.C.A.); Mercier v. Canada (Correctional
Service), [2010] F.C.J. No. 816, [2012] 1 F.C.R. 72, 2010 FCA 167 (F.C.A.), leave to appeal refused
195
196
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It has not been made clear on what basis the selection panels conduct
their work. It is not clear whether they work by consensus or majority vote.
For the nomination of Justices Karakatsanis and Moldaver in 2011,
Minister of Justice Nicholson stated that “[t]he list of six candidates, which
included the two nominees, was unanimously approved by the panel”.200
Similar language was used by the Minister of Justice for the nomination of
Justice Wagner in 2012,201 but was absent in the nomination of Justice
Rothstein in 2006 and Justice Nadon in 2013.202 Subsequent comments by
one member of the selection committee for Justice Nadon’s appointment
assert that confidentiality prohibits members of the panel from even disclosing how it operates.203 The government has simply not made clear the
basis upon which the shortlist is reached.
(g) Who Makes the Ultimate Decision?
Where once it was unclear who actually makes the final decision for appointment, it is now clear that the decision is the Prime Minister’s, advised
by the Minister of Justice. While some scholars have asserted that puisne
judges are appointed on the recommendation of the Minister of Justice and
the appointment of the Chief Justice is the Prime Minister’s prerogative,204
subsequent Ministers of Justice have clearly indicated that the selection of all
justices of the Supreme Court is the choice of the Prime Minister.205

[2010] S.C.C.A. No. 331 (S.C.C.); and Khadr v. Canada (Prime Minister), [2009] F.C.J. No. 893,
[2010] 1 F.C.R. 73, 2009 FCA 246 (F.C.A.).
200
Moldaver & Karakatsanis Transcript, supra, note 84.
201
Wagner Transcript, id.: “A list of three candidates, which included our nominee, were
unanimously approved by the panel.”
202
Nadon Transcript, id.: “the selection panel completed their report and submitted this unranked
list that I referred to of three qualified candidates, which of course included our nominee, Marc Nadon.”
203
NDP MP Françoise Boivin, who was a member of the Supreme Court Selection Panel,
stated that confidentiality prohibited her from even disclosing how the panel operated. See Twitter,
@FBoivinNPD, online: <https://twitter.com/FBoivinNPD/status/396800646881370113>: “You dont
sign off. It could be unanimous, it could be majority.Cant tell coz of confidentiality!”
204
See Devlin, Mackay & Kim, supra, note 85, at 763, citing S.I. Bushnell, “The
Appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court of Canada: Past, Present and Future” in Judicial
Selection in Canada: Discussion Papers and Reports (Canadian Association of Law Teachers
Special Committee on the Appointment of Judges, 1987), at 1.
205
See McLellan, “Foreword”, supra, note 64, at 604; and Cotler, “The Supreme Court
Appointment Process”, supra, note 2. See Rothstein Transcript, supra, note 177; Karakatsanis &
Moldaver Transcript, supra, note 84; Wagner Transcript, supra, note 84; and Nadon Transcript,
supra, note 84. See also Tonda MacCharles, “Supreme Court pick defends qualifications”, supra,
note 64 (stating that Justice Minister Peter MacKay noted that the selection of Supreme Court
justices was the decision of the Prime Minister).
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At each of the four committee hearings, the Minister of Justice explicitly stated that the “Governor in Council will act on the advice of the
Prime Minister”.206 At the Rothstein hearing, Justice Minister Toews explained that the committee was charged “with providing advice to the
Prime Minister. He has undertaken to take into account the deliberations
and views of the committee in deciding whether or not to proceed with
the appointment of Justice Rothstein.” In 2006, it was reported that the
Prime Minister watched the hearings on television. It is unknown whether he watched the subsequent hearings.207
(h) Conclusion: A Transparency Deficit
The reformed Supreme Court appointment process provides many
opportunities for disclosure: prior to a vacancy being announced; when a
vacancy is announced; when the nominee is announced; during the public hearing; and at the moment of formal appointment by the Prime
Minister. Despite frequent and repeated claims by successive governments
about the openness and transparency in the process, we have seen that
more is unknown about the process than is known. I am not alone in concluding that the process is wanting in transparency.208 Writing years after
the Rothstein hearing but before the 2011 appointments, Supreme Court
observer Philip Slayton concluded that “the private nature of the current
practice leads to public suspicion and skepticism”.209 I am not sure that
substantial change has occurred since Slayton wrote those words that
would lead him to change his assessment. My audit of the reforms since
2004 leads me to conclude that they have not fostered significant change
in transparency: there is still a serious transparency deficit in the
Supreme Court appointment process. As discussed in the next section,
the public hearings have failed to address this transparency deficit.

206

Rothstein Transcript, supra, note 177.
In 2013, the Prime Minister departed for Indonesia the day after the Nadon hearing. See
Prime Minister of Canada, Media Advisories, “Public event for Prime Minister Stephen Harper for
Thursday, October 3rd”, October 2, 2013, online: <http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2013/10/02/ publicevent-october-3-2013>.
208
See, e.g., DeCoste, “The Jurisprudence” supra, note 87, at 87: “both the process and the
substance of appointment offend in disgracefully equal measure the principles of transparent
government”; Kent, supra, note 104, at 96.
209
Slayton, supra, note 86, at 246.
207
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2. Accountability
One of the articulated purposes of the reforms was to increase the
role of MPs and reduce the unfettered discretion of the Prime Minister in
the selection process. Based on these criteria, the reforms to the selection
process have not achieved their stated objectives.
(a) Fettering of Discretion
The process that has developed allows the executive to preserve its
control over the selection process while maintaining that it has increased
transparency and accountability.210 The government is able to control
both the input and the output of the selection process, thereby severely
constraining the opportunities for any external actors to influence the
decision-making process.
The executive is able to wholly control the inputs. It provides the
selection panel with a closed list of candidates. The Selection Panel is not
permitted to consider candidates outside this list. The discretion of the
Selection Panel is further circumscribed by the length of the list which it is
assigned to consider. The list of candidates that the government provides to
the Selection Panel has been mislabelled as a “long list”, giving the false
impression that there are a large number of names on this list. However, the
so-called long list does not appear to be significantly longer than the short
list. Since 2006, the government has refused to disclose how many
candidates are on this list. In 2006, it did disclose that there were six
candidates on the “long list”. In the case of the two appointments in 2011, it
was reported that there were 12 or 13 persons under consideration.211 By
controlling the input in this fashion, the government is able to shut out any
unwanted candidates. It may also overlook other worthy candidates.
Second, the government is able to control the output of the process
through the composition of the committee.212 For the appointment of Justice Rothstein in 2006, MPs were in a minority on the advisory committee
that produced the shortlist. Moreover, each of the four official parties
had equal representation on the advisory committee. Since it obtained a
210
Kirk Makin cited Professor Bruce Ryder of Osgoode Hall Law School as saying that the
process imparted “an illusion of accountability”. Kirk Makin, “Screening process has its detractors”
The Globe and Mail (October 19, 2011) A8.
211
Id. (reporting that there were 12 names on the list supplied to the selection panel).
212
Irwin Cotler and Charlie Feldman raise concerns about having parliamentary secretaries
and ministers of the Crown on the selection panels. See Cotler & Feldman, supra, note 36, at 268.
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majority in the 2011 election, the current government has maintained a
majority of three members out of the five on the Selection Panel. The Selection Panel is thus akin to a parliamentary committee where the
governing party has a majority and thus is able to control the process and
the outcome. However, in terms of both transparency and accountability,
the operation of the selection committee is far worse than that of a parliamentary committee. A parliamentary committee operates under prescribed
rules of procedure; the selection committee does not. For the most part,
parliamentary committees conduct their proceedings in public; the selection committee’s proceedings are completely secret. Parliamentary
committees produce reports after their reviews of legislation or other issues; the selection committee does not.
Finally, the parliamentary hearings do not restrain the power of the
Prime Minister either formally or informally.213 In 2004, Conservative
Party members involved in the proceedings, including future Ministers of
Justice Vic Toews and Peter MacKay, criticized the hearings as a “sham”
because the Prime Minister’s selection had effectively been made.214 The
same could similarly be said of hearings over which Ministers Toews,
Nicholson and MacKay presided. At the 2006 hearing, Minister Toews at
least stated that the goal of the hearing was to inform the Prime Minister’s eventual decision, which was to be made two days after the
hearing.215 The Prime Minister reportedly watched the hearing on television.216 At the conclusion of the hearing, Minister Toews encouraged
members of the committee to forward their comments directly to the
Prime Minister regarding their views on the suitability of Justice Rothstein
for appointment to the Supreme Court.217 In the three subsequent hearings, even this pretence was dispensed with and the Prime Minister made
the formal announcement the next day. In one case, the Chief Justice announced the swearing-in dates for the new justice before the Prime
Minister had formally appointed the “nominee”, thus demonstrating the
pro forma nature of the hearings.218
213

The National Post has written that the process allows PMs to appoint poorly qualified or
fringe candidates without any sort of political accountability. Editorial, “A land without Borking”
National Post (October 18, 2011) A14 (noting further that in the case of the 2011 appointments of
Justices Moldaver and Karakatsanis, the Prime Minister had not abused his privilege).
214
Ad Hoc Committee – discussed in Mathen, “Choices and Controversy”, supra, note 14, at 64.
215
Rothstein Transcript, supra, note 177.
216
Id.
217
Id.
218
Cf. Editorial, “Harper v. Harper” The Globe and Mail (October 4, 2012) A14 [hereinafter
“Harper v. Harper”] (claiming that the Prime Minister treats the hearings as a “mere formality”).

160

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d)

(b) Holding Decision-makers to Account for Their Decisions
Accountability “is a means of making responsible the exercise of
power”.219 It requires decision-makers to account for their decisions. In
the judicial context, judges are held accountable through the issuance of
reasons for their decisions. In the government context, under our system
of responsible government, ministers are personally accountable to the
House of Commons for the exercise of power; ministers must answer for
all actions carried out under their authority.220 This is a fundamental
precept of ministerial responsibility under our Constitution.221 Based
on these understandings of accountability, the reforms must be judged
a failure.
To begin, the committee of parliamentarians that interviews the
Prime Minister’s nominee has failed to meet any accountability function.
The first failure is temporal: the time that the government has given the
committees of parliamentarians to prepare for questioning the nominee is
simply inconsistent with the exercise of any serious accountability function.
This is seen in Table 2 below. In 2004, Mr. Cotler gave the ad hoc
parliamentarians one day’s notice in announcing the government’s nominees.222 In 2006, Prime Minister Harper gave MPs three days’ notice; in
subsequent hearings in 2011, 2012 and 2013, two days’ notice was provided.223 This is simply insufficient time for MPs to prepare for hearing
in any serious manner.224 A Globe and Mail editorial stated that two days
was not enough time to read the nominees’ judgments and any speeches
they may have given and to prepare probing questions, and added that
the scrutiny was needed.225

219

Responsibility in the Constitution, supra, note 167.
Id.
221
Id. See also Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, supra, note 64.
222
Carissima Mathen wrote about the 2004 hearing that “[t]he hearing clearly was not
designed to facilitate greater involvement by the legislative branch. The one-day notice period
strains any contrary conclusion.” Mathen, “Choices and Controversy”, supra, note 14, at 62.
223
There was of course no parliamentary hearing for Justice Cromwell’s appointment in
2008. See discussion supra, at 127-28 and accompanying notes.
224
Editorial, “Even good judges need public scrutiny” The Globe and Mail (October 18,
2011) A14; Sean Fine, “New Supreme Court judge prepares for vetting”, The Globe and Mail
(October 2, 2013) A8 [hereinafter “Fine, ‘Vetting’”] (quoting Professor Kathleen Mahoney as
saying: “How do you possibly prepare in such a short period of time?” and Professor David
Schneiderman as saying that a longer process would be a chance to “see if people had views about
the quality of this appointment”); “Harper v. Harper”, supra, note 218.
225
Editorial, “Even good judges need public scrutiny”, id.
220

Date vacancy
announced

Nominee(s)
announced

Time elapsed
(in days)

Public hearing

Time between
nomination and
public hearing

Appointment
confirmed

Abella and
Charron

February 21,
2004 (Arbour)/
March 23, 2004
(Iacobucci)

August 24, 2004

185 days (from
date of Arbour’s
announcement)

August 25, 2004

1 day

August 27, 2004

Rothstein

August 3, 2005

February 23,
2006

205 days

February 27,
2006

4 days

March 1, 2006

Cromwell

April 9, 2008

September 5,
2008

150 days

N/A

N/A

December 22,
2008

Karakatsanis
and Moldaver

May 13, 2011

October 17,
2011

158 days

October 19,
2011

2 days

21 October 2011

Wagner

May 18, 2012

October 2, 2012

138 days

October 4, 2012

2 days

October 5, 2012

Nadon

April 23, 2013

September 30,
2014

161 days

October 2, 2013

2 days

October 3, 2013
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Table 2: Time Elapsed for Supreme Court Appointments, 2004-2013
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After the Nadon hearing, Justice Minister MacKay was asked why in
each of the four hearings held during Prime Minister Harper’s tenure, the
committee had only been given two days to prepare for the hearing. Minister MacKay responded: “As a lawyer you’re very often called before
the court on short notice, and expect to make a case.”226 This is not a satisfactory explanation as to why the government has provided MPs with
such little time to prepare for what is purportedly an important function.
It is instructive that the American selection process which served as
the inspiration for the Canadian reforms takes less time overall to fill a
vacancy and much more of that time is devoted to preparation for the
Senate confirmation hearings. In Canada, due to the mandatory retirement of Supreme Court judges at age 75,227 some vacancies are easily
predicted228 and the pool of candidates is restricted due to regional
requirements. The Americans have no mandatory retirements and the
President is not restricted by regional considerations, as a matter of either
statute or convention. Despite these greater uncertainties, the American
process works quicker and more publicly in announcing a nominee and
giving typically four to six weeks for the Senate to prepare for confirmation hearings. Perhaps in part due to the lack of time to prepare for the
hearings, the Canadian hearings have been criticized as mere “window
dressing”.229
The second failure is structural. In each of the four hearings to date,
there has been overlap in membership between the MPs on the selection
panel and those on the committee interviewing the nominee.230 The
blame cannot only be laid at the feet of the government on this issue but
Sean Fine, “Nadon skates through nomination hearing” The Globe and Mail (October 3,
2013) A3 [hereinafter “Fine, ‘Nadon skates’”].
227
See Constitution Act, 1867, s. 99(2).
228
However, of the eight vacancies considered in this paper, only two (Justice Major in 2005
and Justice Fish in 2013) announced their retirement within a calendar year of their mandatory
retirement date. Justice Binnie retired three years before his scheduled retirement date, which could
hardly be considered a huge surprise (it was well known that he had to retire in three years’ time so
the vacancy was expected; it simply came earlier than might have been anticipated). The other
resignations were well before the scheduled retirement dates and could be fairly characterized as
“surprise resignations”: Justices Arbour and Iacobucci in 2004; Justice Bastarache in 2006; Justice
Charron in 2011; and Justice Deschamps in 2012. The judges of the Supreme Court have provided
the Prime Minister with ample lead time to appoint their successors to the Court in time for the fall
session, which begins the second week of October. However, the Prime Minister has taken
significant time to announce each nominee. See Table 2, above.
229
Fine, “Vetting”, supra, note 224. See also “Harper v. Harper”, supra, note 218; Editorial,
“Judging the judges” Ottawa Citizen (October 18, 2011) A10; Editorial, “Judging the judges” The
Vancouver Sun (October 20, 2011) A16.
230
Cf. Cotler & Feldman, supra, note 36, at 260.
226
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equally at the feet of the opposition parties. Both the Liberals and the
NDP have also chosen to put MPs on the interview committee who were
members of the selection committee.231 In such cases, MPs are in the position of interviewing someone whom they themselves recommended.
We would not expect the government MPs to challenge the Prime Minister’s selection, but we might expect opposition MPs to exercise the sort
of accountability function that they do generally in the House of Commons as opposition MPs. However, opposition MPs are unlikely to do so
when they themselves have been part of the process. In part, they are being asked to challenge their own decisions. The answer to the question
quis custodiet ipsos custodes — who guards the guardians? — is not supposed to be “themselves”.232
Moreover, when on occasion MPs on the committee of parliamentarians
have been critical of various qualifications of the selected nominee, the attempt at accountability has been misdirected at the nominee instead of at
those who participated in selecting the nominee. The most egregious example occurred in 2011 during NDP MP’s Joe Comartin’s aggressive
questioning of Justice Moldaver regarding his lack of proficiency in French.
Such questioning was both hypocritical and misplaced. It was hypocritical
because Mr. Comartin had been a member of the selection panel233 which
according to the Prime Minister unanimously recommended Justice

231
This problem may be tied to the short notice given for the parliamentary hearings. In
2006, three days’ notice was given. In each of 2011, 2012 and 2013, two days’ notice was provided.
It is thus not surprising that the parties chose to put their representatives from the selection panel on
the committee of parliamentarians interviewing the candidate. In 2013, when asked why only two
days was given to the MPs to prepare for interviewing the Prime Minister’s nominee, Minister of
Justice Peter MacKay responded: “As a lawyer you’re very often called before the court on short
notice, and expect to make a case”. Fine, “Nadon skates through”, supra, note 226.
232
The phrase is attributed to the Roman poet Juvenal from his Satires (Satire VI, lines 347-48).
See Wikipedia, s.v. “Quis custodiet ipsos custodes”. The phrase is frequently used to invoke
questions of accountability for the exercise of power. See, e.g., Martin M. Shapiro, Who Guards the
Guardians? Judicial Control of Administration (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1988);
Thomas C. Bruneau & Scott D. Tollefson, eds., Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic
Civil-Military Relations (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2008); Afsheen John Radsan, “Sed
Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes: The CIA’s Office of General Counsel?” (2008) 2 J. National
Security L. & Pol’y 201; Arthur H. Garrison, “The Judiciary in Times of National Security Crisis
and Terrorism: Ubi Inter Arma Enim Silent Leges, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? (When in Times
of War the Law Falls Silent, Who will Guard the Guardians?)” (2006) 30 Am. J. Trial Advoc. Rev.
165; and C. Lloyd Brown-John, Canadian Regulatory Agencies: Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1981), cited in ATCO Gas & Pipelines Ltd. v. Alberta (Energy and Utilities
Board), [2006] S.C.J. No. 4, 2006 SCC 4, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 140, at para. 2 (S.C.C.).
233
“Minister of Justice Announces Members of the Supreme Court of Canada Selection Panel”
(August 5, 2011), online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/news-nouv/ja-nj/2011/doc_32624.html>.

164

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d)

Moldaver for inclusion in the shortlist.234 Mr. Comartin and the other members of the selection panel should have explained why they recommended
Justice Moldaver for appointment. Comartin’s blatant and hypocritical attempt to score partisan political points for his party in Quebec was not lost
on the media covering the hearing.235
While Mr. Comartin’s disquiet over the French proficiency of a Supreme Court candidate was understandable, it was a concern that should
have been raised in the selection panel process.236 Instead of hectoring
Justice Moldaver on why he did not learn French, the proper question
should have been why Justice Moldaver was recommended “unanimously” by the Supreme Court Selection Panel despite his lack of French
proficiency. That was a question that should have been targeted at
Mr. Comartin and his colleagues and not at Justice Moldaver, who cannot
be faulted for not thinking “in his wildest dreams” that he would ever be
a candidate for the Supreme Court.237
Prime Minister of Canada, “PM announces appointment of Justice Moldaver and Justice
Karakatsanis to the Supreme Court of Canada” (October 21, 2011), online: <http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/
news/2011/10/21/pm-announces-appointment-justice-moldaver-and-justice-karakatsanis-supreme-court>:
“A selection panel, comprised of Members of Parliament from both Government and opposition
parties, provided a unanimously approved list of six names for consideration to the Prime Minister
and the Minister of Justice.”
235
Tonda MacCharles, “Appointments highlight secret process: Questions have also been
raised about Prime Minister Harper’s commitment to bilingualism” The Toronto Star (October 18,
2011) A6 (calling Joe Comartin’s criticism of Justice Moldaver “a strange twist” because Comartin
sat on the selection committee); Tonda MacCharles, “Top court accountability an illusion: Supreme
Court judges are appointed by PM, ‘nominees’ just a show” The Toronto Star (October 22, 2011)
A6. Cf. Tobi Cohen, “Top judicial nominees face grilling by panel of MPs” Edmonton Journal
(October 20, 2011) A11 (reporting that interim NDP leader Nycole Turmel stated that the NDP did
not support the Prime Minister’s decision to consider a non-bilingual judge for the Supreme Court
despite the fact that the NDP had been part of the process that had put Justice Moldaver on the short
list). Mr. Comartin also took an unfair swipe at Justice Rothstein in the Moldaver hearing, asserting,
erroneously, that in the parliamentary hearing in 2006, Justice Rothstein had made a commitment to
learn French. A review of the transcript from that hearing reveals that Justice Rothstein made no
such commitment. Rothstein Transcript, supra, note 177. Justice Rothstein took the highly unusual
step of speaking to the media to defend his reputation, which had been publicly besmirched by
Mr. Comartin. See Kirk Makin, “Judge rebukes NDP MPs for claiming he broke vow to learn French”
The Globe and Mail (November 2, 2011), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/
judge-rebukes-ndp-mps-for-claiming-he-broke-vow-to-learn-french/article4248773/>. Mr. Comartin
did not apologize for his comments. Rather, he clouded the matter by speculating that the promise
may have come about through speaking to a third party as part of the work of the Supreme Court
Selection Committee in 2006. It is an interesting question whether Justice Rothstein could have sued
Mr. Comartin for libel since parliamentary privilege does not apply to the hearings.
236
It likely was but we do not know because panel members are bound by confidentiality
obligations.
237
Moldaver and Karakatsanis Transcript, supra, note 84. Justice Moldaver undertook to
learn French and two years later his efforts were on display at the Senate Reference hearing, where
234
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Moreover, it demonstrates that the proper person to be questioned
about the Prime Minister’s selection is either the Prime Minister or the
Minister of Justice, because one of them should account for the selection
of the Supreme Court justice. Of the six sets of Supreme Court appointments since 2004,238 only two provided any semblance of accountability
on behalf of the executive. Thus, as discussed in Part II, in 2004, Minister of Justice Irwin Cotler appeared before the ad hoc committee and
explained the basis upon which he had recommended Justices Abella and
Charron and the qualities that they possessed.239 In no other case did either the Minister of Justice or the Prime Minister explicitly articulate the
reason why the nominee had been selected. In each of the four parliamentary hearings that we have had to date, the Minister of Justice simply
“introduced” the nominee as one would introduce any speaker, by reading his or her bio.
Only in 2006 did Minister of Justice Vic Toews go beyond the nominee’s bio to provide additional description of the nominee which may be
taken as justification. Minister of Justice Toews said:
Justice Rothstein is well known as a brilliant jurist with remarkable
intelligence and great analytical skills. He is well respected among his
judicial colleagues, works collegially, and is highly respected in the
legal profession. His output of judicial writing is prolific, with over 900
decisions during his 13 years on the bench. His writing is clear, precise,
and complete.
Justice Rothstein is known as an extremely hard worker with the
highest degree of integrity and personal and professional ethics. He has
been described as pleasant, engaging, and thoughtful. He is also an
excellent speaker, and I assume that he will have the opportunity to
prove me correct in that respect. He is known as a good listener and as
one who seeks out all points of view with respect to legal arguments.
He is respectful of counsel and is open to sharing his knowledge and

he asked counsel questions in French. While some might take issue with the quality of Justice
Moldaver’s French, it is abundantly clear that he has embraced the task of learning the language
seriously and making his best efforts to participate in Supreme Court proceedings in French as
quickly and thoroughly as possible.
238
I treat multiple appointments as a single “set” because in each case they were appointed
together. Thus, the six are (1) Justices Abella and Charron (2004); (2) Justice Rothstein (2006);
(3) Justice Cromwell (2008); (4) Justices Moldaver and Karakatsanis (2011); (5) Justice Wagner (2012);
and (6) Justice Nadon (2013).
239
Carissima Mathen gave Cotler low marks for accountability in his August 2004 appearance
before the Ad Hoc Committee. See Mathen, “Choices and Controversy”, supra, note 14, at 62.
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experience with law students and others. I am confident that he will
240
make an excellent addition to the Supreme Court of Canada.

In none of the hearings since 2004 did the Minister of Justice answer
any questions and in all hearings since 2006, the Minister of Justice’s
role was described as “chair”; the Minister simply presided over the proceedings and introduced each nominee, effectively reading the nominee’s
bio. Not only have the hearings failed in accountability, they have
defeated accountability by shifting the focus away from the figures who
should be held accountable for the appointment selection — the Prime
Minister and the Minister of Justice — and onto the person who has been
nominated. Nominees may be able to answer many questions, but what
they cannot answer is why the Prime Minister selected them.
(c) Accountability Misplaced
It is hard to imagine a “perfect” candidate for the Supreme Court.
Every candidate has strengths and weaknesses. The hearings have succeeded to some degree in raising some of the perceived deficiencies of
each of the candidates: the lack of French proficiency for Justices
Rothstein and Moldaver; the relative appellate inexperience of Justices
Karakatsanis and Wagner; and the supernumerary status of Justice
Nadon.
The hearings have distorted accountability by attempting to require
the nominees to account for their deficiencies. These are questions of
qualifications, not of accountability. It is valid to ask a judge how he or
she will be able to function at the Supreme Court with only a year or two
of appellate experience or without the ability to follow hearings in
French. But these questions do not go to the critical question of accountability: why was this nominee chosen over other qualified ones? That is
not a question that the nominee can or should answer. Rather, it is a question for those who make the ultimate decision: the Prime Minister or the
Minister of Justice.
(d) Unexpected Accountability: The Nominee
The reforms have succeeded in producing accountability of a different sort: accountability for the nominee who is about to ascend to the
240

Rothstein Transcript, supra, note 177.
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highest judicial office in the land. Supreme Court judges, whose decisions cannot be appealed, have limited accountability. They are protected
by life tenure, restricted only by mandatory retirement at age 75, and can
only be removed in exceptional circumstances. Supreme Court justices
are subject to the jurisdiction of the Canadian Judicial Council, and while
there have been complaints against Supreme Court justices from time to
time, none have ever been validated.241 Supreme Court judges are accountable to their colleagues and they are held accountable through their
decisions, which must be accompanied by reasons. Those decisions may
be critiqued by academics, lawyers, ministers, parliamentarians, the media and members of the public, but Supreme Court judges are never
called to account publicly for their decisions, other than through their
reasons for judgment. Under our system, such attempts would be considered inconsistent with our notion of judicial independence.
Supreme Court judges interrogate lawyers at oral argument; Supreme
Court judges themselves are never interrogated. The public hearing for the
nominee is the only time that future Supreme Court judges may explain
themselves publicly. There is something humbling in requiring a potential
justice to explain him- or herself prior to ascending to the highest judicial
office. This is a form ex ante accountability which, while not as strong as
ex post accountability, is a form of accountability nonetheless.242
3. Public Education
The reforms should be judged a success in terms of achieving the objective of improving public knowledge about the Supreme Court and its
judges. As discussed in Part IV, this objective has developed over time; it
was not part of the motivation in the design of the process.243 At the
Rothstein hearing, Minister of Justice Toews stated that “Canadians
deserve to know more about those individuals who are appointed to the

241
No Supreme Court of Canada justice has ever faced any serious complaint of judicial
misconduct that raised the spectre of removal.
242
See Devlin, Mackay & Kim, supra, note 85.
243
Writing in 1999, Jacob Ziegel argued that public hearings could serve an educative
function for parliamentarians. See Ziegel, “Merit Selection”, supra, note 28, at 14: “There is also
another reason that justifies the introduction of a separate confirmation procedure ... it will help to
educate our elected representatives on the impact of the Charter on traditional concepts of
responsible government and give them a better appreciation of where the line should be drawn
between their role and the Charter’s role.”

168

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d)

Supreme Court, and we are here today to provide that opportunity”.244
Such statements were repeated by successive Ministers of Justice in
2011, 2012 and 2013.245 The media has recognized that the hearings give
Canadians a chance to get to know the judges before they ascend to the
nation’s highest court.246
There has been significant media interest in the public hearings. The
Rothstein hearing was broadcast live on CBC Newsworld, while the others
have aired on CPAC. Many journalists attended and reported on each hearing.
The hearings have succeeded in humanizing the judges and the process
of judging. Canadians have learned about each of the judges as individuals, including their backgrounds and something about their personalities.
They learned that Justice Rothstein is witty and good-humoured, and that
he once worked on a railway dining car. They learned that Justice Karakatsanis worked in her family’s Greek restaurant and that she is
trilingual. They learned of Justice Moldaver’s working-class origins in
Peterborough, Ontario, of the impact of his parents on his development
and the precipitous beginnings to his legal career in law school. And of
course, Canadians learned about his lack of proficiency in French and his
commitment to learn French from his brother, who holds a doctorate in
French literature. Justice Wagner told Canadians about his family

244

Rothstein Transcript, supra, note 177.
See Karakatsanis and Moldaver Transcript, supra, note 84 (emphasis added):
This public hearing is intended to bring openness and transparency to the appointments
process by allowing Canadians to learn more about those individuals who will be appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada … To the two nominees, thank you very much
for opening up about yourself and your vision of this. I think you’re going to be a great
part of the fabric of this country. You said you and your families are so proud of your being here. I can tell you all of us are very proud. (Minister of Justice Nicholson)
Wagner Transcript, id.:
This public hearing is intended to bring openness and transparency to the appointments
process by allowing Canadians to learn more about those individuals who are nominated
to the Supreme Court of Canada ... I believe that this process is a very worthwhile one to
gain some transparency, and let Canadians get some familiarity with those who occupy
such important positions as those on the Supreme Court. (Minister of Justice Nicholson)
Nadon Transcript, id.:
This process, which was begun by our government, is intended to bring greater openness
and transparency to the judicial appointments process by allowing Canadians, through this
procedure, to learn more about those individuals who may be appointed to the Supreme
Court of Canada, our highest court in the land. … This entire process has been very helpful
… in giving Canadians a better understanding not only of who sits and aspires to be a part of
the Supreme Court of Canada but also, as Judge Nadon has said, of the quality of the jurists
that we have in this country, which is exceptional. (Minister of Justice MacKay)
246
Editorial, “Judging the judges” Ottawa Citizen (October 18, 2011) A10; Editorial,
“Judging the judges” Vancouver Sun (October 20, 2011) A16.
245
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upbringing in Montreal, how he won his first legal battle at the University
of Ottawa by convincing the administration to let him pursue his bachelor’s degree at the same time as his law degree, and how he was affected
by the events of September 11. Canadians famously learned much about
Justice Nadon’s hockey prowess, but also about his legal career and his
work on the Federal Court.
The hearings have revealed the work of judging in considerable
depth. Carissima Mathen opined that the Rothstein hearing “provided a
significant educational benefit to those who are not familiar with appellate court decision-making, which incidentally would include many
lawyers”.247 While there are those who feel that much more about the
judicial process could be revealed through the process,248 ultimately the
hearings should be judged a limited public education success.

V. TOWARDS A TRULY REFORMED SUPREME COURT
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS
1. Do We Need Reform?
There are some who believe that the appointment process that has
served the Supreme Court well for 129 years249 is only in need of minor
change.250 Political Scientist Nadia Verrelli has rightly questioned whether various suggested reforms to the appointment process would produce a
better Supreme Court than we have had so far.251 Verrelli’s question also
raises the possibility that reforms could produce a worse Supreme Court
than we have had so far, or could damage the Court as an institution.252
But doing nothing is also a risk to the Court. As I have shown, the current reforms have failed to meet the promised goals of transparency and
accountability. While this failure is certainly no fault of the Supreme
Court or of its judges, it has the potential to sow public cynicism about
the appointment process and, perhaps, about the Supreme Court. Writing
Mathen, “Choices and Controversy”, supra, note 14, at 70.
See, e.g., Plaxton, “The Neutrality Thesis”, supra, note 50.
249
That is, from the Supreme Court’s creation in 1875 until 2004, when the reforms began.
250
See McLellan, “Foreword”, supra, note 64, at 606: “The challenge for Canadians is to
take a good judicial appointments process and make it even better.”
251
Nadia Verrelli, “Reforming the SCC: Rethinking Legitimacy and the Appointment
Process” in Verrelli, supra, note 20, 114, at 122.
252
Mathen, “Choices and Controversy”, supra, note 14, at 71-72: “Hasty and ill-conceived
changes may prove impossible to reverse in the event that they make the current situation worse,
not better.”
247
248

170

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d)

in 2006, Sauvageau, Schneiderman and Taras argued that “[t]o some degree, the court sits precariously on top of a volcano of
political distrust and conflict. Although there have been long periods
during which the volcano has remained dormant, there are times when
the volcano threatens to erupt.”253
Politicization of the Court would threaten its stature and its independence. To date, the Court has benefitted from the perceived
evenhandedness of appointments to it.254 We have never had a movement
to impeach a Supreme Court judge the way that the Americans had with
calls to impeach Earl Warren or, more seriously, to impeach William
Douglas in the 1970s. Our judges are not seen as carrying the allegiance
of the party of the Prime Minister who appointed them; 255 we have no
equivalent of Bush v. Gore.
We should not, however, confuse stability with complacency. Lorne
Sossin was correct when he wrote in 2008 that “[t]he system of appointing judges in Canada should continue evolving because it is out of step
with Canada’s legal and political culture, not because the judges we have
are unworthy”.256 Having promised transparency and accountability in
reforming the Supreme Court appointments process, our political leaders
should now deliver on it, lest the failure to do so cultivate contempt for
themselves, continued loss of trust in our political institutions and a
decline in respect for the Supreme Court.
To begin, the government should deliver on its promise of transparency over the appointment process. It should publish a detailed protocol
on the Department of Justice website which sets out the process of
appointment from beginning to end. Similar guidance documents are

253

Sauvageau, Schneiderman & Taras, supra, note 151, at 26.
Writing in 1999, Jacob Ziegel stated, that “If major controversies have been avoided over
the appointment of Supreme Court judges since the adoption of the Charter … this is largely because
successive Prime Ministers — Trudeau, Mulroney, Chrétien — have shared similar constitutional
philosophies and because the full impact of the Charter has not yet sunk in.” Ziegel, “Merit
Selection”, supra, note 28, at 9-10.
255
On the relative lack of partisan polarization in Canada, see generally Benjamin Alarie &
Andrew Green, “Should They All Just Get Along? Judicial Ideology, Collegiality, and Appointments
to the Supreme Court of Canada” (2007) 58 U.N.B.L.J. 73.
256
Lorne Sossin, “Judicial Appointment”, supra, note 81, at 12. There may be different
considerations for appointments to the Supreme Court as compared to other levels of court. It is the
court of last resort and the most visible court in the country. Conversely, lower courts are where
most citizens would access the Canadian justice system. The different considerations are beyond the
scope of this paper.
254
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published by the Privy Council Office257 This protocol — perhaps to be
entitled “Guide to the Appointment of Supreme Court Justices” — would
include the constitutional and statutory context for appointment of
Supreme Court justices and the information set out below.
The proposed Guide to the Appointment of Supreme Court Justices
would clearly set out the qualifications for appointment and the desired
qualities for candidates. In order to promote transparency and accountability, these qualities need to be publicly articulated at the beginning of
the process and not raised after the nominee has been selected, as Professors
Hogg and Baudoin did in each of the public hearings to date. Moreover,
as discussed in Part III, Professors Hogg and Baudoin were not
consistent in the criteria that they articulated, nor was there any indication that the Supreme Court Selection Panels or the Minister of Justice
had actually used the criteria they suggested.
As to the actual criteria, there is no shortage of suggestions of necessary qualities for Supreme Court justices. Former Minister of Justice
Irwin Cotler articulated criteria in 2004,258 and it may be that the government has continued to use these criteria. The Judicial Appointments
Commission in England and Wales has a detailed list of “qualities and
abilities”.259 Academics have suggested various qualities necessary for a

257

See, e.g., Accountable Government, supra, note 168; Canada, Guide to Making Federal
Acts and Regulations: Cabinet Directive on Law-Making, online: <http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/
index.asp?lang=eng&page=information&sub=publications&doc=legislation/cabdir-dircab-eng.htm>;
Canada, Governor in Council Appointments Guide, online: <http://www.appointments-nominations.gc.ca/
prsnt.asp?page=gicIntro&lang=eng>. See generally Canada, Privy Council Office, Reports and
Publications – by Title, online: <http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/index.asp?lang=eng&page=information&
sub=publications&doc=publications-eng.htm>.
258
See supra, note 31.
259
Judicial Appointments Commission (England and Wales), Starting a Judicial Career,
Qualities and Abilities, online: <http://jac.judiciary.gov.uk/application-process/qualities-andabilities.htm>. According to the Judicial Appointments Commission, “merit” consists of five qualities
and abilities: intellectual capacity (a “high level of expertise in your chosen area or profession”, the
“ability quickly to absorb and analyse information”, an “appropriate knowledge of the law and its
underlying principles or the ability to acquire this knowledge where necessary”); personal qualities
(“integrity and independence of mind”, “sound judgments”, “decisiveness”, “objectivity”, the
“ability and willingness to learn and develop professionally”, and the “ability to work constructively
with others”); ability to understand and deal with people fairly (“an awareness of the diversity of the
communities which the courts and tribunals serve and an understanding of differing needs”, the
“commitment to justice, independence, public service and fair treatment” and the “willingness to
listen with patience and courtesy”); authority and communication skills (an “ability to explain the
procedure and any decisions reached clearly and succinctly to all those involved”, the “ability to
inspire respect and confidence” and the “willingness to listen with patience and courtesy”);
efficiency (“ability to work at speed and under pressure” and the “ability to organize time effectively

172

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d)

Supreme Court justice.260 For example, Jacob Ziegel’s “wish list for the
essential attributes of a Supreme Court judge” includes
complete personal integrity; robust health; industriousness and good
work habits; a sense of collegiality with other members of the Court to
enable the court to discharge its very heavy work load efficiently and
without unnecessary friction; an excellent intellect and fine writing
skills to match it; a deep understanding of the Canadian constitution
and the Charter; and of the role of law in general in contemporary
Canadian society; and not least, keep discernment in being able to
261
project the consequences of a judgment on to a broader canvass.

There may be objections to some of these criteria, but it is important to
engage in an open discussion about them.
There should be an arm’s-length Advisory Committee to advise the
Minister of Justice and the Prime Minister on the appointment.262 As to
the composition of the committee, the critical factor is that it not replicate party strength in the House of Commons, lest it become simply
another committee controlled by the government of the day; the committee should have equal representation from all recognized political parties.
There is a benefit to having some non-MPs on the committee to bring
perspectives from other areas such as the bar, the bench and the public.
However, such representatives should not dominate the committee, because judges and lawyers have a tendency to prefer people like
themselves, which makes it unlikely that candidates who are considered
outside the legal “mainstream” would be considered, as discussed below.
The Advisory Committee should be free to consider whichever candidates it identifies through its consultation process. It should be required
to consider candidates submitted to it by the Minister of Justice, but it
should not be restricted to these candidates. By submitting five to eight
names to the Supreme Court Selection Panel, the Minister of Justice has

and produce clear reasoned judgments expeditiously (including leadership and managerial skills
where appropriate)”.
260
See, e.g., Devlin, Mackay & Kim, supra, note 85, at 828.
261
Ziegel, “Merit Selection”, supra, note 28, at 13 (citations omitted).
262
Many favour some form of independent nominating commissions for Supreme Court
justices. See Kent, supra, note 104, at 97; Hutchinson, supra, note 20, at 109; Canadian Assn. of
Law Teachers, “Canadian Association of Law Teachers Panel on Supreme Court Appointments”
(June 2005); Ziegel, “Merit Selection”, id.; Peach, supra, note 85; Devlin, Mackay & Kim, supra,
note 85; Canadian Bar Assn., Supreme Court of Canada Appointment Process (Ottawa: Canadian
Bar Assn., 2004); Martin Friedland, A Place Apart: Judicial Independence and Accountability in
Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Judicial Council, 1995), at 256-67 [hereinafter “Friedland”].
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been able to effectively control the process and minimize the role of the
Advisory Committee. The Advisory Committee should prepare an unranked short list, along with an evaluation of the strengths and
weaknesses of each of the recommended candidates on the short list and
the reasons for their recommendation. The deliberations and recommendations of the Advisory Committee should remain confidential, but the
procedures under which it operates should not. The mandate and rules of
procedure of the Advisory Committee would be set out in the proposed
Guide to the Appointment of Supreme Court Justices.
The Advisory Committee should complete a report on its work which
would be submitted to the Minister of Justice at the same time as the
short list is submitted. The Report should be released at the same
time the Minister or the Prime Minister announces the nominee. Many
modern judicial appointments processes contain some reporting requirement.263 This is viewed as an essential element of accountability. For
example, under the legislation creating the ad hoc Selection Commissions for appointments to the U.K. Supreme Court, those commissions
must submit a report identifying who was selected and who was consulted.264
The report of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee should contain
the following elements: (1) an explanation of the mandate and composition of the Advisory Committee as per the proposed Guide to the
Appointment of Supreme Court Justices; (2) a reiteration of the criteria
for evaluation as set out in the proposed Guide to the Appointment of
Supreme Court Justices; (3) a timeline of the work and meetings of the
committee, i.e., when it was established, when and how it met; when it

263
See, e.g., Ontario, Judicial Appointments Advisory Committee, Annual Report for the
Period from 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2012 (Toronto: Judicial Appointments Advisory
Committee, 2013). The Ontario Judicial Appointments Advisory Committee (“JAAC”) submits an
annual report to the Attorney General which contains, inter alia:

recruitment and outreach strategy;

legal background of judges appointment;

appointments from representative groups (Women; Francophones; First Nations; Visible
Minorities; and Persons with Disabilities);

confidentiality policy;

criteria for Appointment;

an overview of the process;

recommendations for changes; and

profiles of the members of the JAAC.
264
See Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, s. 28 (U.K). discussed in Shimon Shetreet & Sophie
Turenne, Judges on Trial: The Independence and Accountability of the English Judiciary, 2d ed.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 141.
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submitted its recommendations and its report to the Minister of Justice;
(4) a profile of the candidates that it considered: (a) number submitted
from the Minister of Justice, number suggested by others; (b) professional
profile of candidates: judges, lawyers or academics; (c) demographics of
candidates for consideration: gender; race; region; linguistic; age, etc.;265
and (5) an explanation of who was consulted, by office although not
necessarily by name.
Perhaps most controversially, I do not think that the Minister should
be bound by the short list. We should not lose sight of the fact that statute
vests the power of appointment with the Governor in Council, which acts
on the advice of the Prime Minister. It is arguable that after the Supreme
Court Reference, this power cannot be altered without a constitutional
amendment. Even bracketing the constitutional issue, under our system
of responsible government, it is the executive that must account to
Parliament for its actions, and then indirectly to the electorate.
Moreover, there is no indication that we would improve the quality
of appointments to the Supreme Court by completely fettering the discretion of the Minister of Justice and the Prime Minister. Professor Hogg
has argued that the Advisory Committee should be dispensed with altogether because it compromises this principle of executive appointment:
“For a single, occasional, high-profile appointment, I do not think the
government should be restricted to a short list developed by an advisory
committee … My concern is that the dynamics of deliberation in a diverse committee may eliminate candidates against whom some objection
can be made. The tendency, I would fear, is that only the safest and least
controversial persons would achieve consensus. Such persons are often
excellent judges, but may not always be the best person for the Court at a
particular time.”266 Hogg cited the example of the appointments of Bo265
Cf. the discussion of diversity and representativeness of the judiciary in Devlin, Mackay
& Kim, supra, note 85, and Sossin, “Judicial Appointment”, supra, note 81.
266
Hogg, “Appointment of Justice Marshall Rothstein”, supra, note 49. Professor Hogg also
expressed concerns about leaks from the Advisory Committee if too many people are involved with it.
While this may have been a concern with the larger and more diverse committee used for the
appointment of Justice Rothstein in 2005-2006, it was not a concern with the smaller, “closed”
panels consisting solely of MPs used for the subsequent appointments of Justices Moldaver and
Karakatsanis (2011), Justice Wagner (2012) and Justice Nadon (2013). On the issue of leaks from
the committee of persons being considered, I am not particularly troubled by this for two reasons: (1)
there is an increasing tendency for senior executive positions to be open competitions; (2) there is
nothing unusual in the disclosure of candidates for senior executive positions. Indeed, such
disclosure may foster accountability by allowing the media and the public to debate the pros and
cons of different candidates. It may also assist the government in its deliberations by raising issues
about a potential appointment such as bilingualism, a controversial past ruling, some questionable
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ra Laskin (“[h]e would probably have been regarded as an ‘unsound’
candidate by an advisory committee in 1970”) and Bertha Wilson as ones
unlikely to have been recommended by an advisory committee.267 Hogg
is most certainly correct in his assessment, but I do not think that this is
reason to dispense with the Advisory Committee; it is reason to ensure
that the Minister of Justice is not bound by its recommended short list.
Under our constitutional system, the Prime Minister or his or her Minister of Justice is accountable for this appointment and any reformed
appointment process should so hold them accountable.
The public hearings should continue but are in need of a drastic
overhaul in order to properly serve an accountability function. To date,
concerns regarding the politicization of the process and threats to the independence of the judiciary have not materialized.268
The three key changes are: (1) the composition of the committee of
MPs; (2) the time for the committee of MPs to prepare for its work; and
(3) the participation of the Minister of Justice. On the composition of the
committee of MPs, this should not include members of the Advisory
Committee who recommended candidates for the Minister’s consideration, including, in all likelihood, the candidate selected by the Prime
Minister as his or her nominee. Simply put, including such persons in a
supposed vetting function is nonsensical, as was seen in the incident involving Mr. Comartin’s challenging of Justice Moldaver’s Frenchlanguage proficiency.
If the public hearings are to serve a serious accountability function,
MPs must be provided with sufficient time to prepare for the hearings: to
read and analyze the nominee’s judgments and writings, to consider the
analysis and critique of academics and members of the media, etc.269 Instead of two days’ notice, MPs and members of the public should be
given at least two weeks’ notice to prepare for the hearings.

past affiliation or, in the case of Justice Nadon, a serious challenge to his qualification for
appointment under the governing statute. We live in an age of transparency and it is simply
unrealistic for candidates for any position, especially high public office, to expect secrecy.
267
Hogg, “Appointment of Justice Marshall Rothstein”, id.
268
Such concerns were raised by the Bar, individual judges and others. See Canadian Bar
Assn., Supreme Court of Canada Appointment Process (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association, 2004);
Bertha Wilson, “Methods of Appointment and Pluralism” in D. Magnusson & D. Soberman, eds.,
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Most importantly, the Minister of Justice should be questioned at the
hearing. The hearings have likely succeeded in making Canadians more
aware of the work of the Supreme Court and of the new justices,270 but
they have utterly failed in providing direct accountability for the Prime
Minister’s selection. The Minister of Justice should explain the process
and, whether the nominee was selected from the short list or whether the
Prime Minister decided to select a candidate who was not on the short
list, the Minister would have to explain and justify this decision.271
While I do not favour giving Parliament a veto over the appointment
at this point,272 I do think that MPs should have more than a pro forma
role.273 At present, they serve a function not much beyond staging in a
play produced by the executive. At the least, after the hearing, MPs
should submit a report on the nominee and on the hearing to the Minister
of Justice and the Prime Minister for their consideration. This will slow
down the process at a critical time and hopefully lead to more reflection
by both the committee members and perhaps the Prime Minister and
Minister of Justice.

VI. CONCLUSION
Those who championed reforms to the appointment process in the
1990s and 2000s promised Canadians more openness and accountability.
They claimed they would empower Parliament and check the unfettered
power of the Prime Minister. On these bases, the reforms must be judged
a failure, if not worse. Instead of transparency and accountability, they
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have brought opaqueness and obfuscation. Instead of addressing the
democratic deficit, the reforms have exacerbated it. They have not
increased public confidence in the appointment process, nor have
they empowered Parliament. The democratic audit conducted in this
paper concludes that there is a continued transparency and accountability
deficit in the Supreme Court appointment process.
Conversely, it is unlikely that the failed reforms have damaged the
judiciary or the Supreme Court. Despite Mr. Cotler’s assertion in the epigraph of this paper of the link between the integrity of the appointment
process and the independence of the judiciary,274 there is no indication
that the reform process has weakened the Supreme Court or decreased
public confidence in the high court or its judges. In terms of making
Canadians more aware of the individuals who sit on our highest court,
and of the work done by them and by the Court as an institution, the
reforms must be judged a success.
Are the reforms worth it? I do not believe we can return to the days
before 2004 of a process shrouded in secrecy with unfettered and unaccountable executive power over appointments to our highest court. I have
attempted to chart a path for further reforms, which I think would
achieve the goals of transparency and accountability without compromising the Supreme Court as an institution. Whether our political leaders
will have the will to tackle the new democratic deficit they have created
remains to be seen.
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